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Abstract
This thesis examines the agency problem surrounding the corporate hedging de-
cision. It gives insight on how managerial incentives impact corporate hedging de-
cisions and on how executive compensation can be used to minimize the agency
problem and factors determining the optimal compensation. The model predictions
are then tested against empirical data. One of the factors affecting optimal execu-
tive compensation is volatility of commodity prices. To explore this, the last chapter
develops an empirical model to forecast commodity prices.
Past theoretical and empirical studies found that risk-averse managers tend to
overhedge, without analyzing how to align shareholders’ and managers’ hedging
strategies. In this dissertation I develop a model aligning hedging strategies using ex-
ecutive compensation, incorporating a risk-averse manager’s utility into the hedging
decision. Consistent with standard theories, the model show managers hedge more of
the expected production than shareholders. The model shows there is a decrease in
corporate hedging with the presence of managerial equity-based incentive pay. It also
shows managerial incentives can be used to impact corporate hedging to minimize
agency problem. To align and optimize managerial hedging decisions, the optimal
managerial incentive should comprise more of the equity-based portion when there
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is a low risk tolerance, or low price volatility, or a low variable cost. In contrast,
when there is high coefficient of absolute risk aversion, or low price volatility, or
high variable cost, it is best to compensate the manager with a lower equity-based
portion in order to optimally align hedging decisions. In other words, by determin-
ing and examining the primary factors affecting compensation scheme includes risk
aversion, price volatility, and profit margin we can determine the optimal compen-
sation scheme. When there is a low (high) coefficient of absolute risk aversion, low
(high) price volatility, or low (high) variable cost, then optimal compensation should
comprise more (less) equity-based incentives.
Next, using empirical data I test the model predictions from the theoretical frame-
work; (i) when incentive pay increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, (ii) when
price volatility increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, while price volatility have
a negative relation with equity-based incentive, (iii) when risk aversion increases,
the optimal hedge ratio decreases, while risk aversion have a negative relation with
equity-based incentive, and (iv) when variable cost increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases, while variable cost have a negative relation with equity-based incentive.
The predictions are tested against data obtained from oil and gas firms using a stan-
dard regression approach. I find that the model predictions are further supported
by empirical evidence from the oil and gas industry showing (i) a negative rela-
iii
tionship between incentive pay and hedge ratio, (ii) a negative relationship between
price volatility and hedge ratio/incentive pay, (iii) a negative relationship between
risk aversion and hedge ratio/incentive pay, and (iv) a negative relationship between
price volatility and hedge ratio/incentive pay. Overall, the first two chapters clarifies
the optimal compensation scheme under varying economic environments in order to
mitigate the agency problem associated with hedging decisions.
Last, a new model for the series of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil
prices process is introduced, which accommodates spikes and local trends in its tra-
jectory, as well as the multimodality of its sample distribution. The model relies on
the convolution of two stationary processes, causal and noncausal processes, which
allows for the estimation of the monthly WTI crude oil prices series. As an alter-
native specification, the mixed causal-noncausal autoregressive (MAR) models are
estimated and used for oil price prediction. Two forecasting methods developed in
the literature on MAR processes are applied to the data and compared. In addi-
tion, this chapter examines the long-term relationships between the WTI crude oil
price, the Ontario Energy Price Index (OEP) and the Ontario Consumer Price Index
(OCPI). These relationships are established using the cointegration analysis. The
vector error correction (VEC) model allows us to predict the Ontario price indexes
and the WTI crude oil prices. This chapter shows an alternative simple method of
iv
forecasting Ontario price indexes from stationary combinations of WTI crude oil price
forecasts obtained from the mixed causal-noncausal autoregressive (MAR) models.
This chapter shows that both method of prediction yields forecasts that are close
approximation of the out of sample value.
v
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Commodity prices are volatile and difficult to predict. Hedging reduces the risk of
sudden financial losses due to adverse market movements. The hedging decision does
not always lie in the hands of the shareholder; instead it is often made by managers.
Managers are risk-averse, and their hedging strategies do not always maximize firm
value (Jin and Jorion, 2006). The first part of my thesis focuses on how executive
compensation can be used to align the shareholders’ and managers’ hedging decision
to maximize firm value. The last part of my thesis focuses on how commodity prices
can be forecasted. In particular, I examine the bi-modality in the distribution of the
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices, which appears to disregarded the
existing literature and the co-movements between WTI crude oil prices, the Ontario
Energy Price Index (OEP) and the Ontario Consumer Price Index (OCPI).
The second and third chapters examine how the hedging decisions between man-
agers and shareholders can be aligned using executive compensation, as there is a
tendency for risk-averse mangers to over-hedge (Holmstorm and Ricart i. Costa,
1986; Smith and Stulz, 1985). My research develops a model to solve this agency
problem in an attempt to align hedging using executive compensation. First, fac-
tors used to determine the optimal executive compensation schemes are identified.
Second, the role these factors play in aligning the conflicting incentives in hedging de-
cisions is assessed, with the findings then applied in practice to minimize the agency
2
problem.
The second chapter uses a standard principal-agent model and endogenously de-
termines the hedging strategy and compensation. The one period model incorporates
the risk-averse manager’s utility into the hedging decision while keeping shareholder
risk neutral; the model focuses on a linear derivative setting. Two scenarios are com-
pared: first best, and second best. First best is fully observable; shareholder observes
effort and makes the hedging decision, while second best is when managers make the
hedging decision and have information of effort. The manger is paid a salary and
equity incentive, with the latter tied to firm value. By comparing the two scenarios
with changing parameters, I can determine [isolate] the factors that affect optimal
hedging and optimal compensation. The model finds that there are three factors:
risk aversion, price volatility and profit margin that determine optimal compensation.
This is in line with Brown and Toft (2002) which find that optimal hedge depends
strongly on price and quantity volatilities, and also correlation between prices and
profit margin. In this chapter my model shows how managerial equity incentive pay
impacts corporate hedging decisions as compared to the absence of incentive pay.
With the presence of incentive pay the model shows a decrease in hedging. The
model can also show the agency problem in hedging is more pronounced with high
risk aversion, low price volatility and high profit margin. Using this model we can
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determine the optimal managerial compensation scheme that mitigates the agency
problem. The optimal managerial compensation scheme should be comprised of less
equity-based incentives when there is high risk aversion, high price volatility or low
profit margin.
The third chapter examines the model prediction derived from the previous chap-
ter. The predictions are: (i) when incentive pay increases, the optimal hedging ratio
decreases, (ii) when price volatility increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, while
price volatility exhibits a negative relation with equity-based incentive, (iii) when
risk aversion increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, while risk aversion shows
a negative relation with equity-based incentive, (iv) when variable cost increases, the
optimal hedge ratio decreases, while variable cost displays a negative relation with
equity-based incentive. The validity of these model predictions are then empirically
test against a sample of U.S. oil and gas firm data from 2011-2014, which allows the
focus to center on commodity hedges.
In January 1997 financial reporting release No. 48 was released which require
firms to discloser of derivative instruments and quantitative information about mar-
ket risks. This financial reporting release allows for the examination of hedging
activities in each firm. Using that data we used a simple OLS model to test the
model predictions. The companies in the sample use both linear and non-linear
4
derivatives to hedge their price risk. The model prediction was based on a linear
derivative setting, however, the empirical test includes both those derivatives. The
empirical testing shows that equity-based executive compensation is negatively re-
lated to hedging which is consistent with prior research from Chen, Jin, and Wen
(2011), and Tufano (1996). The chapter further shows evidence that price volatility
is negatively related to hedging, while risk aversion is negatively related to hedging.
Therefore, in general, the model predications are in line with empirical evidence.
The fourth chapter develops an econometric model to forecast the WTI crude oil
prices, the OCPI, and the OEP. As illustrated in the previous chapters, one of the
factors affecting optimal executive compensation is volatility of commodity prices.
Being able to estimate commodity prices can give some insight to the economic
environment, thus providing some indication to the optimal compensation scheme.
Therefore, to explore how commodity prices can be forecasted, the next chapter
develops an empirical model to predict future commodity prices.
The WTI crude oil price forecast is obtained by using the convolution approach
of stationary causal and noncausal processes. To forecast the Ontario price index,
this chapter estimates the long-term co-integrating relationships between the OCI,
OEP and WTI crude oil prices. Then, given these estimated long-term relationships,
the forecasts of both the Ontario price indexes can be obtained as functions of the
5
WTI crude oil price forecast, combined with the forecast of the stationary series of
departures from the long-run equilibrium.
The WTI crude oil price forecast can be obtained by forecasting the convoluted
series or from a simple mixed causal/noncausal model of WTI crude oil prices. The
latter approach allows comparing two methods of forecasting for noncausal processes
developed by Lanne, Luoto and Saikkonen (2012) and by Gourieroux and Jasiak
(2016). While, the convolution of stationary causal and noncausal process is parsi-
monious and accommodates the local trends and spikes in the oil price, it also takes
into account the bi-modality of its sample distribution which has not been studied
in the existing research. The presented convolution approach shows a viable alterna-
tive approach for modelling the monthly WTI crude oil prices to accommodate the
bi-model sample distribution.
As can be observed in my research, both the OCPI and OEP display a parallel
global upward trend, while OEP exhibits local trends and spikes. The local trends
and spikes in both the series of OEP and OCPI indexes appear to occur simultane-
ously as those observed in the trajectory of the WTI crude oil prices. Therefore, by
estimating the long-term cointegrating relationships between the series, this chap-
ter finds that Ontario price indexes can be forecasted using the forecasts of crude





Aligning Corporate Hedging Deci-
sions with Executive Compensation
8
2.1 Introduction
Financial derivatives are widely used in corporations as a mean of risk management,
with hedging strategies affecting firm value. While shareholders/principals hire man-
agers/agents to manage the firm involving them and to increase the valuation of the
firm, hedging strategies employed by managers do not always maximize firm value
(Jin and Jorion, 2006). Both past theoretical and empirical studies indicate a ten-
dency for risk-averse managers to overhedge (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, 1986;
Smith and Stulz, 1985). Yet surprisingly, there is limited research examining how to
align shareholders’ and managers’ incentives in terms of corporate hedging decisions.
To help fill the gap, this chapter develops a principal-agent model, and examines
how executive compensation can be used to align such hedging decisions. The overall
objective of the chapter is to identify factors used to determine the optimal executive
compensation schemes, assess the role these factors play in aligning the conflicting
incentives in hedging decisions, and apply these findings in practice to minimize the
agency problem.
In this chapter, executive compensation is used to achieve a balance in the con-
flicting hedging incentives between shareholders and managers. Tufano (1996) sug-
gests that executive compensation can influence how managers choose to hedge. Sim-
9
ilarly, Prendergast (2002) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003), find that hedge risk
affects the amount of annual executive compensation. The latter provides evidence
that executive compensation includes a risk-premium for exposure to risk. Futher-
more, empirical research (Rogers, 2002 and Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002) indicates
that there is a link between risk management and managerial incentive, suggesting
that managerial compensation design plays a key role in optimizing hedging deci-
sions. Building on these studies, this chapter shows that in addition to how certain
managerial executive compensation schemes can be utilitzed to help align hedging
decision, it also explains when to deploy a more (versus less) equity-based compen-
sation scheme to yield the optimal hedging strategy. To examine how to align these
incentives, I examine the optimal hedging strategy of shareholders and compare it
to the optimal hedging strategy of managers. Similar to Smith and Stulz (1984),
the model incorporates the risk-averse manager’s expected utility into hedging deci-
sion. As noted, the hedging decision and executive compensation affect one another;
therefore, unlike Smith and Stulz (1984), the hedging decision and executive compen-
sation are endogenously determined. In my model, the risk-averse agent’s expected
utility increases with firm value, in line with Smith and Stulz (1985). Their paper
however, does not examine how this compensation can solve the conflicting interest
in hedging decisions.
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To study the difference in optimal hedging strategies, I examine two scenarios.
Under the first scenario, there is hidden information whereby only managers observe
effort and have information on the hedging decision, and shareholders decide on the
compensation scheme. The compensation received by managers can be bifurcated
into fixed (i.e. salary) and equity-based incentive (i.e. performance-related bonus)
components. Given the compensation scheme, managers will choose effort and a
hedging strategy that maximizes their expected utility. The risk-averse managers
exhibit a concave expected utility function, with the degree of concavity dependent
on their coefficient of absolute risk aversion, while their compensation (i.e. wealth)
is a convex function of the firm’s value. It is noted in Smith and Stulz (1984) that
the optimal hedging policy is to hedge the firm completely if the manager’s end
of period utility is a concave function of the end of period firm’s value; in which
case, managers will only take on risk if they are compensated to do so. If, on the
other hand, the manager’s end of period wealth is a convex function of the end of
period firm value, then some of the hedging will be eliminated. If managers are not
properly compensated, they may not manage risk in a way that maximizes firm value.
The risk-averse managers will only maximize shareholder wealth if doing so will also
maximize their own expected utility. In this case, the solution to the maximization
problem yields a second best solution.
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In the second scenario, both effort and hedging are contractible. Shareholders
observe the amount of effort, and devise both the hedging strategy and compensation
scheme. In this case, there is perfect information and would be considered the first
best solution. Here, shareholders maximize their utility, which is to maximize the
firm value by choosing the effort exerted, the hedging strategy and the compensation
scheme. However, this case is not achievable in practice, as information about effort
is hidden, and managers are the ones managing the firm’s operational risk.
In both cases, this chapter assumes that the policy of corporate risk management
only allows for the use of linear contracts, which in turn, allows for the closed-
form solution of the model to be interpreted. In this model, hedging decisions and
executive compensation are studied together. The addition of a risk-averse manager’s
utility and executive compensation to the hedging decision yield a non-standard
result.
The analysis support the view that managers will only take on risk when paid to
do so. As observed in the numerical example, managers hedge more of the expected
production than the shareholders. This means that shareholders take on more risk
than managers.
This model also yields a set of intuitive outcomes. For example, when the equity-
based incentive pay increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, because the manager
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is both compensated to undertake increased risk and a larger portion of their wealth
is linked with firm value. This is consistent with Chen, Jin, and Wen (2011), who
empirically show that higher managerial equity incentives result in lower degrees
of hedging. Additionally, the model shows that when the firm’s volatility in price
increases, the optimal strategy is to hedge closer to the firm’s average production
(where the hedge ratio is closer to 1), and the compensation scheme should have
a lower incentive portion. As a result of heightened uncertainty under increased
price volatility, it is natural to lower expected losses by hedging close to average
production. Moreover, the agency problem is less pronounced when price volatility
is high, therefore the manager would require less equity based compensation to close
the gap between their incentives.
The model also indicates that idiosyncratic aspects such as volatility in hedge-
able price risk, variable cost, and executive risk aversion, in aggregate, influence
optimal hedging and compensation decisions. These findings can help delineate an
optimal compensation strategy that aligns the hedging decisions under different en-
vironments/firm characteristics. For instance, when variable costs are high, the
shareholder can lower the equity incentive-pay portion to align the hedging deci-
sion. Given the model results are expressed in closed form, the role of how each
factor affects the optimal compensation and hedging strategy can be interpreted and
13
analyzed.
Overall, this chapter endeavors to bridge the gap in the past literature by using a
principal-agent model to examine the optimal hedging strategies between risk-averse
agents versus risk-neutral principals in a linear financial derivatives setting, and also
proposes an optimal compensation structure. The model shows how incorporating
managerial incentive pay will impact the hedging decision. By considering the man-
agerial incentive decision, the model shows that the optimal hedge would decrease.
In additionally, it also provide insights into how the optimal compensation scheme
should be used when faced with different firm-specific characteristics to minimize
the agency problem in the hedging decision. The model shows that optimal manage-
rial incentive should comprise more of the equity-based portion when there is a low
risk tolerance, or a low price volatility, or a low variable cost, to align and optimize
managerial hedging decisions. In contrast, when there is high coefficient of absolute
risk aversion, or high price volatility, or high variable cost, it is best to compensate
the manager with a lower equity-based portion in order to optimally align hedging
decisions.
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section includes a brief literature
review of hedging. Section 2.3 describes the model and framework of the study by first
examining the agent’s optimization problem, followed by the principal’s optimization
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problem. Section 2.4 compares the optimal hedging strategy under different scenarios
and changes in parameters. Section 2.5 displays the model findings and prediction.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section 2.6.
2.2 Literature Review
Past research focuses on why firms hedge, and how firms should hedge, while others
have examined the agency problem in the risk management area. Up to now, these
studies do not provide a solution on how exactly to align the corporate hedging
decision using executive compensation, and do not provide insight on how executive
compensation could be adjusted under certain economic environments. The following
are some of the past literature that relates to this topic.
Numerous papers focus on why firms hedge, for example, Smith and Stulz (1984)
studies why some firms hedge and others do not, and they show that a value maxi-
mizing firm would hedge for three reasons: (i) reduction in expected taxes, (ii) lower
costs of financial distress, and (iii) managerial risk aversion. Others argue that firms
hedge: (i) to increase debt capacity (Ross 1997 and Leland 1998), (ii) to ensure suffi-
cient internal funds for investment when external funds are costly (Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein 1993), or (iii) to reduce probability of downside risk (Stulz 1996). Thus,
the reasons why firms hedge can be generalized into two categories: (i) increase firm
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value, and (ii) managerial risk aversion.
There are many theories that suggest managerial risk aversion plays a prominent
role in affecting hedging behavior. Bodnar, et al. (2004) document why firms hedge
by questioning the managers and find that personal risk aversion plays an important
role. While Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002) find empirical evidence that manager’s
risk aversion is the key determinant to hedging strategy; in particular they find
that, managers will hedge less when they are compensated more with risk taking
incentives. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) also show that risk incentive compensation
is crucial in determining hedging policy, while Chen, Jin, and Wen (2011) provide
evidence that hedging may be motivated by managerial risk aversion in particular.
Jin and Jorion (2006) meanwhile, show that hedging does not increase firm value
for U.S. oil and gas producers, but instead serve as a function of managerial risk
aversion. Overall, these studies all indicate that risk-averse managers directly affect
firm hedging strategy.
On the other hand, there are studies documenting how firms should hedge. Brown
and Toft (2002) find that optimal hedge depends strongly on price and quantity
volatilities, and also correlation between prices and profit margin. They examined
environments where firms should use a linear vs. non-linear hedging strategy, and find
that when price risks are high, quantity risk is low, or when there are no correlations
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between price and quantity, it is better to use a linear hedging strategy. Though
Brown and Toft (2002) examine how firms hedge, they do not examine the impact
of a risk-averse agent on hedging strategy. In addition to examining hedge strategy,
this chapter also looks at the role of the risk-averse agent under different economic
environments, similar to Brown and Toft (2002). Smith and Stulz (1985) meanwhile,
note that the optimal hedging policy is to hedge the firm completely, and the manager
will only take on risk if they are paid to do so. Lastly, Kuwornu, et al (2005)
use a classical principal-agent model to derive and provide a tool to determine the
optimal hedge ratio, but neglect to provide a link between hedging ratio and optimal
compensation structure. Therefore, when determining optimal hedge strategy under
the optimal compensation, the role of the compensation structure and risk-averse
agent has yet to be explored.
There are studies that attempt to solve the agency problem in the risk manage-
ment area. The model Smith and Stulz (1984) devises takes the manager’s compen-
sation as given, despite the fact that manager’s compensation and hedging strategy
are often endogenously determined. Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) formulate
a model that examines optimal contracting when the risk-averse manager makes the
investment decision. They find that managers accept few investments. However,
it does not specifically study the risk-averse manager’s role in hedging decision nor
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does it examine how the compensation can be used in difference environments to
align the investments. Chang (1997) use a simple model to look at what the factors
are in determining both hedging and compensation policies. In it, they examine the
scenarios where the manager can either hedge or not hedge, and gives zero or 100
percent effort. They find that optimal hedging policy and stock-based compensa-
tion contract are determined by the firms’ abandonment value, profitability, and the
extent of its risk exposure. However, their model is not done in a principal-agent
framework and does not include non-hedgeable risks. They also do not examine the
difference in hedging strategy and the optimal compensation scheme when managers
versus shareholders make the decision. Both of those are dually important as Chao
et al (2011) provide empirical evidence on the impact of hedging and executive com-
pensation on firm value. This chapter takes it a step further whereby the model
endogenously determines the optimal manager’s compensation and hedging strategy.
In addition, the empirical testing examines the hedge ratio and factors affecting the
hedging decision, and how to align the hedging decision with managerial equity-based
incentives.
Studies also examine Moral Hazard problems in which the manager has more in-
formation of risk exposure then the shareholders (DeMarzo and Duffie 1991). How-
ever, all these previous studies do not closely examine the role of the risk-averse
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manager when determining the optimal hedge strategy along with the optimal com-
pensation scheme to align conflict in hedging. This chapter addresses how executive
compensation can be use to align the hedging strategies under varying economic
environments and finds empirical support for the model predictions.
2.3 Framework and Model
Given that managers are known to have non-diversified human capital investment
in the firm, and that risk neutral shareholders can diversify risk across investments,
differences in risk tolerance arises resulting in conflicting optimal hedging strategies.
Here, two different risk tolerance cases are modelled, and the effects they have on
optimal hedging strategy and optimal compensation scheme. Taking the standard
agency theory approach, this model is a one period model with a risk-averse agent, the
manager, and a risk neutral principle, the shareholder. The optimal hedging strategy
and optimal compensation scheme are endogenously determined in the model.
In the first case, there is information asymmetry regarding the agent’s effort;
the principal can only observe the outcome, but not the level of effort. The risk-
averse agent chooses to maximize the expected utility by choosing the level of effort
and the amount to hedge, given the compensation schedule is determined by the
principle. The agent will receive a fixed salary and an incentive portion (equity-
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based incentive). This incentive portion is given as a percentage of the firm value.
The agent is subjected to a participation constraint where the agent will only take
on employment opportunity if the compensation package meets a minimum expected
utility, reservation utility. As opposed to the agent, the risk neutral principal can
diversify their investment across multiple assets, and thus, is only concerned about
expected payoff. The principal maximizes their expected utility by selecting the
compensation method and amount. The asymmetry of information yields a ′second
best solution′.
The second case is one with perfect information resulting in a ′first best solution′.
The principal contracts directly on effort and decides the amount to hedge along
with the compensation scheme. In practice, the effort of the manager is unobserved
and the hedging decisions are in the hands of the risk-averse managers. However,
modelling this case can serve as a benchmark when comparing ′second best solution′
against the ′first best solution′.
Similar to other risk management studies, the Value of the firm ′V ′t is determined
by revenue minus expense. Revenue is calculated by taking the number of hedged
contracts ′h′ at the Forward Price ′F ′o
1 subtracted by the Spot price ′S ′t
2 plus
1The forward price is given by:
Fo = Soe
t(r−q)
r is the risk free rate and q is the carry cost
2Given the Black-Scholes Return:
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the product of quantity ′qt(a)
′ produced multiplied by the Spot rate. The quantity
produced is a function of the agent’s effort.
Vt = h(Fo − St) + q(a)St − c1(q(a))− c2 (2.3.1)
Agent’s Payoff and Utility:
The agent’s return/payoff ′π′t is given by, equation 2.3.2, adding the fixed salary
′s′,
with the incentive component ′b′ (percentage of firm value) multiplied by the firm
value ′V ′t , before subtracting the disutility of effort
′g(.)′. Next substitute equation
2.3.1 to equation 2.3.2 to get the payoff function in terms of all the variables.
πt = s+ bVt − g(a) (2.3.2)
πt = s+ b[h(Fo − St) + q(a)St − c1(q(a))− c2]− g(a)
Note, the quantity produced ’q(a)’ is equal to the production function f(a) plus
white noise ε with zero mean and variance σ2ε .
q(a) = f(a) + ε
c1(q(a)) = c1(f(a) + ε)
ds
s = µdt+ σ
√
∂W , where W ∼ N(0, t) and ∂W =
√









The agent is risk-averse and has a negative exponential utility; stated in certainty





See Appendix 1 for Calculation for Et(πt) and V art(πt)






s t − 1)e2µt(h− f(a)2 + b2σ2ε [S2oeσ
2
s t+2µt − 2Soc1eµt + c21]]
To examine the cases closely and to deduct a close form solution, both ′f(a)′ and
′g(a)′ will take on a simple functional form; the agent exhibits linear productivity and
quadratic effort (f(a) = ka and g(a) = 1
2
ηa2 , where k is the marginal productivity,
η is the effort aversion).
2.3.1 Case 1 - Hidden Information (Second Best)
Agent’s problem
In this case, the agent’s problem is solved by maximizing the expected utility, this is
given in terms of certainty-equivalent approximation, CEA. Here, the agent chooses
effort ′a′ and hedge amount ′h′, then the principal chooses salary ′s′ and incentive
pay ′b′:
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By taking the First Order Condition, FOC, with respect to ′a′ to maximize the
effort it gives the following solution:
γb2V ar(S)[h− ka]k − ηa+ bk(Soeµt − c1) = 0 (2.3.4)
By taking the FOC with respect to hedge amount ′h′ gives:
h− ka = Fo−Soeµt
γbV ar(S)
(2.3.5)
As ′h′ is the amount hedge and ′ka′ is the average production, ′h − ka′ shows the
difference between the hedge amount and average production. Substitute ′(h− ka)′














Equation 2.3.6 shows that effort (a) depends on the incentive based pay (b); the
higher the incentive pay the more effort the manager is willing to exert. With higher
incentive pay the manager will receive a higher return by increasing the value of the
firm through production. Therefore, they will demonstrate more effort to increase
production in order to increase their return. The equation also shows that if the
marginal productivity (k) increases, then effort (a) will also increase. As marginal
productivity (k) increases, the manager can produce more with the same level of
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effort. Consequently, the higher the marginal productivity, the greater the effort the
manager will exert as there is a higher return per effort.
To interpret equation 2.3.5, as ′ka′ gives the average production, when the co-
efficient of absolute risk aversion (γ), equity incentive pay (b), volatility in price
(V ar(S)) or spot price (So) increases, it would decrease the difference between the
number of hedge and average output. If the parameters γ, V ar(S) and spot price
(So) increases, the agent would want to hedge closer to average production. It seems
intuitive that if the agent is more risk averse, they would limit risk and hedge close
to the output. Similarly, when price volatility is high, risk-averse managers face
increased price uncertainty and would want to hedge closer to average production.
Equation 2.3.5 also illustrates that if forward price at time 0 is greater than the
expected spot price at time t, F > E(S), the optimal amount hedged would be closer
to the average production (as the prices are expected to decrease). If the forward
price today is higher, selling outputs at the forward price would yield a higher return.
On the other hand, if F < E(S) then it would make sense to hedge less than average




In certainty equivalent terms, the principal’s expected payoff/utility, CEP, is given
by Et((1− b)V − s), which is the left over firm value after compensating the agent.
Since the principal is risk neutral they only care about maximizing firm value. By
substituting V with equation 2.3.1 the expected utility becomes:
CEP = (1− b)[h(Fo − Soeµt) + f(a)Soeµt − c1f(a)− c2]− s (2.3.8)
The principal’s optimization problem is to maximize the following equation:
maxs,b((1− b)[h(Fo − Soeµt) + f(a)Soeµt − c1f(a)− c2]− s) (2.3.9)
The maximization problem is also subjected to the following constrains on effort ′a′,












The participation constrain is given by the following formula:






s t − 1)(h− ka)2 + b2σ2ε [S2oeσ
2
s t+2µt − 2Soeµtc1 + c21] > Wo
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Wo is certainty equivalent value that defines the agent’s reservation utility.
3
Below is the principal’s expected payoff, CEP, after including the participation
constrain:
CEP = h(Fo−E(St))+f(a)E(St)−c1f(a)−c2−Wo + g(a) +
γ
2
b2V ar(S)[h− f(a)]2 + γ
2
b2G







To solve the principal’s optimization problem, take the first order condition, FOC,
with respect to salary ′s′






s t − 1)(h− ka)2 + b2σ2ε [S2oeσ
2
s t+2µt − 2Soeµtc1 + c21] +Wo
and take the FOC with respect to agent’s incentive value ’b’, which is given as a
3Given that :




G = σ2ε [S
2
oe






portion of the firm’s value.
kAFo −B(Fo − E(S))b−2 − c1Ak − γbG = 0
Finally, multiply by b2 gives:
ψ(b) = −γGb3 + [kA(Fo − c1)]b2 −B(Fo − E(S)) = 0 (2.3.10)
ψ
′
(b) = 2[kA(Fo − c1)]b− 3γGb2
The equation cannot be explicitly interpreted. Figure 2.1 is the graphical solution of
’b’ under the base case parameters, it examines the incentive portion in the agent’s
optimization problem, The base case numerical parameter values are detailed and
analyzed in 2.4.
[Insert Figure 2.1:Graphical solution of the equity base incentive, b, that opti-
mizes ψ(b) under the base case detailed in session 2.4]
2.3.2 Case 2 - Observable (First Best)
Alternatively, in the second case (’first best solution’), the principal is able to observe
effort ′a′ and chooses amount hedge ′h′, incentive pay ′b′ and salary ′s′.
The principal would maximize their payout subject to the agent’s participation
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constraint.4
maxa,h,s,b(1− b)V − s
maxa,h,s,b((1− b)[h(Fo − Soeµt) + f(a)Soeµt − c1f(a)− c2]− s)
Take the FOC with respect ’h’ to maximize the hedging decision :
[Fo − Soeµt]− γV ar(St)b2[h− f(a)] = 0





Take the FOC with respect to ’a’ 5 and substituting in [h− ka] from equation 2.3.11
into 2.3.12 to solve for ’a’:
Soe





4Subjected to the following participation constraint












5This gives the First Order Condition with respect to effort, ’a’ : f ′(a)Soe
µt − c1f ′(a)− g′(a)−
γ[b2V ar(S)[h− f(a)]f ′(a)] = 0
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Take the FOC with respect to ′b′ then substitute [h − ka] from equation 2.3.11 to






, where0 ≤ b ≤ 1 (2.3.14)
The optimal soluiton for incentive pay, ′b′, can result in a corner solution where
there is no incentive pay, b = 0. This solution is reasonable as the shareholders are
making all the decisions and observe effort. Comparing the case with no incentive
pay (i.e. Brown and Toft, 2002) versus the presence of incentive pay shows how
managerial equity incentives change the optimal hedge decisions. It indicates how
hedging decision would be affected in the absence of managerial equity incentives








In the special case where there is no incentive pay, b=0 , the hedging ratio
would be higher as compared to the case with some incentive pay involved in the
6This gives the FOC solution to incentive pay ′b′: −γV ar(St)(h− ka)2b− γGb = 0. Which can
result in a corner solution where b = 0 (which is a reasonable soluation given that shareholders are
chosing all variables), or after further substitution the equation becomes 1b2
(Fo−E(St))2
γV ar(St)
− γG = 0.
The optimal hedging decision can be further examined by substituting optimal ’b’ from equation












compensation scheme. That is consistent with the fact that managers are risk averse
and will only take on risk when compensated. In other words, when incentive pay is
taken in consideration it would encourage managers to take on additional risk and
to hedge less.
2.3.3 Summary Results Case 1 and Case 2
To compare Case 1 (second best scenario) and Case 2 (first best scenario), the opti-
mization solutions from both the cases are summarized in Table 2.1.
[Insert Table 2.1: Results from Case 1 and Case 2]
It compares the (i) principal-agent’s problem where the agent chooses both effort
and the amount to hedge, while the principal chooses the amount of fixed salary and
equity-base pay, with (ii) the case where the principal chooses all the aforementioned
choice variables. First, as seen from the table, when comparing the level of effort
to exert, ′a′, the only difference between the two cases is the incentive portion the
agent receives, ′b′. This outcome is intuitive as the agent will increase effort only if
given the incentive to do so, as there is a disutility of effort. As compared to case 2,
the effort is not determined by the incentive pay since principal observes and chooses
effort, thus the agent will have to deliver full effort.
Second, in both the scenarios the hedge amount depends on the average produc-
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tion (k) and an adjustment term. This adjustment term includes the firm/market
specific parameters. The solution in the second case provides insight into which pa-
rameters affect equity incentive pay. However, the difference in the amount of hedge,
′h′, between the two cases is not easily interpreted. This difference in hedge amount
is also due to the equity incentive portion, which is consistent with previous studies
(Tufano, 1996). The first and second terms both have incentive pay ′b′ embedded
in it, but this is endogenously determined and cannot be meaningfully interpreted
here. Though the variables are endogenous, some insight can be gain by rearranging
the equations:








The term ′h− ka’ is the difference in the amount hedge and average production,
thus, in the ’Case 2: first best case’, the principal will hedge 1
b
(where ’b’ between
0 and 1) of what the agent would hedge. However the average production, ′ka′, is
different in both cases as it depends on effort, which in turn is dependent on equity
incentives, ′b′ as well. The incentive portion, ′b′, cannot be easily interpreted, because
in the first case a closed form solution is not prevalent.
Since incentive pay, ′b′, is endogenously determined we cannot directly com-
pare/interpreted the difference in amount hedge and incentive pay, but using this
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model, in the next section I will compare different economic environments numer-
ically, showing the difference between the ’first best solution’, where the principal
makes all the decisions, and the ’second best solution’, where the manager makes
some decisions.
2.4 Compare optimal hedging strategies
This section examines the solutions derived in the model by analyzing the factors that
determine the optimal hedge. The solutions can be analyzed by assigning numerical
values to the parameters in the equations from Table 2.2. It examines the effect
of risk aversion, price volatility and variable costs on the optimal hedging strategy
and compensation scheme under the ’first best solution’ and ’second best solution’.
The spot price So is normalized to 1. The base case includes reasonable parameters
estimates that are taken from past literature (i.e. Brown and Toft, 2002) where:
 variable costs are 0.25 and fixed costs are 0.3
 agent’s marginal productivity k = 2
 effort aversion η = 3
 ρ=1.03, where ρ = et(r−q)
 µ is 0.05
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 σ2S = 0.55, quantity volatility = 0.15, thus Variance in St = 0.3904
 Base case coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ = 5
Table 2.2 shows the difference between the two optimal hedging strategies and
incentive pay under the base case scenario.
[Insert Table 2.2: Base Case of Numerical Example]
In the base case, the agent would choose to hedge closer to average production of
the firm, while the principal is willing to take on additional risk by hedging further
away from average production. As expected, the effort is higher in the first best
solution because there is no hidden information, and the principal can observe and
choose effort. The optimal incentive is higher when managers are the ones making
hedging decisions; this aligns with previous research where principal will have to pay
the agent to take on risk. This incentive portion can be lower when the principal
makes all the decisions.
2.4.1 Change in coefficient of absolute risk aversion
Next, the effect on change in risk aversion to the hedging strategy and optimal
compensation is examined. To study this effect, the base case is examined where
γ =5, which is then adjusted both upwards and downwards to γ = 7 and γ =3,
respectively, to compare the results.
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[Insert Table 2.3: Change in coefficient of absolute risk aversion]
Table 2.3 shows the change in coefficient of absolute risk from 3 to 7. An increased
coefficient of absolute risk aversion means that the agent is more risk averse, which
leads to a reduction in effort. The change in effort is intuitive, when the agent’s
risk tolerance decreases, they would not be willing to work as hard for unforeseeable
results. Under the first best scenario, changes in risk aversion does not affect effort
or the hedge ratio, as effort is observed and the shareholders are the ones making the
hedging decisions. Surprisingly, an agent’s hedge ratio decreases with risk aversion,
while in both cases, an increase in risk aversion shows a decrease in the incentive
portion for optimal compensation. One would expect that as risk aversion increases,
the optimal hedge ratio would increase, and the incentive pay would be higher when
risk aversion increases. However, the solutions from the model shows the opposite
which could be due to a higher level of optimal incentive portion in compensation





k2b2γV ar(S)(Fo − c1)
In the base case scenerio, the assumption is that the spot price at time t is greater
than forward price at time 0. This means that the price is expected to increase,
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Fo < E(St). Holding all parameters the same, if risk averison increases the hedge
ratio is expected to also increase. However, when incentive pay, ′b′, is endogenously
determined this relationship is not observed. The solutions from the model illustrates
that the optimal incentive pay is lower with an increase in risk aversion. When the
agent is more risk-averse they would rather receive a compensation schedule with
a higher portion in fixed amount and a lower portion in incentive based pay. This
can be due to the fact that when managers are highly risk averse, they prefer a fixed
salary rather than a higher incentive base pay, since the latter is not optimal/efficient.
The increase in risk aversion is met with a decrease in incentive pay and the net effect
(when the prices are expected to increase, Fo < E(St)) results in a decrease in hedge
ratio.
From the FOC, we see the first term is 1. When h
ka
= 1 the firm is hedging
100% of average production. Here, when the prices are increasing, the second term
is negative, therefore when the second term is higher it means a lower amount of
the average production is being hedged. Since the prices are expected to increase,
hedging less of the average production is in turn less risky. As an agent is risk
averse, they would want to take less risk and therefore would want to hedge less of
the average prodcution when prices are expected to increase. This explains why a
decrease is observed in hedging activities even though the risk aversion is increasing.
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On the contrary, when prices are decreasing the agent is already hedging close to
average production. The second term from the FOC would be positive when prices
are expected to decrease, therefore when the second term is higher it means a higher
amount of average production is being hedged. Hedging more of the average pro-
duction translates into taking on less risk since the prices are expected to decrease.
In the case where, Fo > E(St), if the manager’s risk aversion increases it will cause
the hedge ratio to also increase. This would be in line with standard theory whereby
when the agent is more risk averse they have a tendency to overhedge.
[Insert Figures 2.2 and 2.3: Graphical solution to optimal equity-base incentive,
′b′ when γ =3 and γ =5 and graphical solution to optimal equity-base incentive, ′b′
when γ =7]
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 represents the case 1 graphical solution to the FOC with
respect to equity base incentive, ′b′, as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion changes
from 3 to 7. This is when the manager decides the level of effort and chooses the
amount to hedge and the shareholder pays them a fixed and equity base incentive
portion. In general, as risk aversion increases, the equity base incentive portion
should correspondingly decrease.
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2.4.2 Change in price volatility
The change in economic environment would change the optimal hedging strategy.
For example, when prices are volatile, the firm would likely want to hedge closer
to average production. The effect of change in price volatility in hedging strategy
between the ’first best solution’ and ’second best solution’ can be determined by
comparing the results when σ2s = 0.55 changes to σ
2
s = 0.20 (i.e. The price volatil-
ity/variance St changes from 0.39 and 0.045). Empirical data shows crude oil price
volatility ranged from 28% to 46% between the years 2011 and 2015.
[Insert Table 2.4: Change in price volatility]
Table 2.4 shows the change in price volatility. The difference in hedge ratio
between the managers and shareholders decreases when volatility increases. For
example when σ2s = 0.55 decrease to σ
2
s = 0.2, the difference between managers’ and
shareholders’ hedge ratio increases from 0.9610 (= (0.9610) − (0.0378)) to 1.1174
(= (0.7626)− (−0.3548)). In both cases when volatility increases, the optimal hedge
ratio moves closer to average production. In a high price volatility environment,
both the agent and principal would hedge closer to average production as both the
manager and the shareholder would want to reduce the increase risk due to increase
in volatility. Thus, their hedging strategy would be closer to each other, as compared
to when price volatility is low. Therefore optimal compensation schedule in low price
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volatility environments should comprise more of the incentive portion to close the
gap between the differing hedging incentives. When volatility in prices are high, an
agent would need a lower incentive portion to make the optimal hedging decision.
2.4.3 Change in Variable Cost
Next, the change in variable cost on the model is examined. In both cases, when
variable cost is high the manager would put in less effort, as it would take more
effort to produce the same amount of product. The solution also shows the optimal
compensation scheme consist of a lower incentive pay portion when variable cost is
high. In both cases, the hedge ratio would decrease with increase in variable cost.
When variable cost is low the agent’s hedge ratio is further away from the principal’s
hedge ratio, in other words, the agency problem is more pronounced when the variable
is low.
[Insert Table 2.5: Change in Variable Cost]
The above could be due the fact that low variable cost translates into a higher gross
margin, which means more funds are generated per sale. The firm will make more
with each additional sale, therefore managers will want to hedge more to manage
their risk exposure. This is becasue both average production and effort will increase
when variable cost is low.
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2.5 Summary of Model Findings and Prediction
The above model shows that the agent’s hedge ratio is further away from the optimal
hedge ratio for the principal when (i) the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion
is high, (ii) volatility in spot price is low and (iii) variable cost is low under the
optimal compensation scheme devised in each scenario. This optimal compensation
scheme is determined by the firm specific economic environments for example, when
the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is high, when volatility in spot price






k2b2γV ar(S)(Fo − c1)
Model Prediction 1 : When incentive pay increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases
Model Prediction 2 : When price volatility increases, the optimal hedge ratio
increases, while price volatility has a negative relation with equity-based incentive
Model Prediction 3 : When risk aversion increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases, while risk aversion has a negative relation with equity-based incentive
Model Prediction 4 : When variable cost increases, the optimal hedge ratio
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decreases, while variable cost has a negative relation with equity-based incentive
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter develops a theoretical model to examine the moral hazard problem in
corporate hedging decisions between risk neutral shareholders and risk-averse man-
agers. It examines how this conflict of interest can be aligned through the use
of optimal executive compensation scheme by comparing the ’first best solution’
(shareholders decide on hedging strategy) to the ’second best solution’ (managers
decide on hedging). Depending on the different economic states the firm faces, the
shareholders should deploy different incentive structures to align manager’s hedging
decisions with theirs. More specifically, the optimal compensation should comprise
of more(less) equity-based incentive if the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is low
(high), price volatility is low(high), or variable cost is low (high).
Past research examined why and how firms should hedge; however, it does not
closely examine the role of the risk-averse agent when determining optimal hedge
strategy and the optimal compensation scheme. Moreover, it does not provide an-
swers to how the shareholders’ and managers’ hedging strategies can be aligned. This
chapter bridges this gap by integrating the risk-averse manager’s expected utility and
executive compensation into the corporate hedging decision.
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The theoretical model find that managers have the tendency to overhedge, which
is consistent with other researchers have found. Under the optimal compensation
scheme, managers will hedge closer to the expected production of the firm as com-
pared to the shareholders. This chapter also gives practical insights to how to com-
pensate managers in different states.
The theoretical model focuses on the linear financial derivatives setting a possible
extension is to develop a formal theoretical model studying the effects of different
types of derivatives while considering the role of the risk-averse managers. Developing
such a model can provide insight into which derivative is most beneficial for different
types of firms when the managers make the hedging decision under varying envi-
ronments. Future research in this area can also consider extending this one-period
model to a continuous model to examine its effects.
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Figure 2.1: Graphical solution of the equity base incentive, b, that optimizes ψ(b) under
the base case detailed in section 2.4
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Table 2.1: Results from Case 1 and Case 2























In case 1, the manager chooses the effort ’a’ to exert and the amount to hedge ’h’, while the
shareholder chooses the fixed salary ’s’ and the equity based incentive ’b’. In case 2, the shareholder
observes effort ’a’ and choose amount to hedge and the compensation structure.
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Note: The following gives the equation to the optimal ’h’ in case 2 if the optimal ’a’ and ’b’ was











Figure 2.2: Graphical solution to optimal equity-base incentive, ’b’ when γ =3 and
γ =5
Figure 2.3: Graphical solution to optimal equity-base incentive, ’b’ when γ =7
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Table 2.2: Base Case of Numerical Example
 Case 1: Second Best Case 2: First Best
Effort ′a′ 0.2696 0.5200
Hedge Amount ′h′ 0.5183 0.1452
Incentive ′b′ 0.5185 0.1104
Average Quantity ′f(a)′ 0.5392 1.0400
Hedge Ratio ′h/f(a)′ 0.9610 0.0378
The table presents the base case results. It shows the optimal level of effect ′a′ , amount hedge
′h′, equity-base incentive portion ′b′, expected production ′f(a)′ and hedge ratio ′h/f(a)′ that
maximizes utility in the both cases (Case 1: hidden information and Case 2: perfect information.).
Table 2.3: Change in coefficient of absolute risk aversion
γ 3 5 (Base Case) 7
2ndBest 1st Best 2ndBest 1st Best 2ndBest 1stBest
a 0.4496 0.5200 0.2696 0.5200 0.1925 0.5200
h 0.8782 0.1452 0.5183 0.1452 0.3640 0.1452
b 0.8646 0.1425 0.5185 0.1104 0.3702 0.0932
f(a) 0.8992 1.0400 0.5392 1.0400 0.3850 1.0400
h/f(a) 0.9766 0.0378 0.9610 0.0378 0.9454 0.0378
As the coefficient of absolute risk aversion increases the manager’s optimal level of effort decreases
while they hedge less and the optimal compensation should comprise of an increase in the equity
incentive portion. In first best scenario, the manager effort is observed, thus the effort exerted does
not change with coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The hedge amount increases along with the
equity incentive portion.
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Table 2.4: Change in price volatility
σ2s 0.55 (Base Case) 0.3 0.25 0.2
2ndBest 1st Best 2ndBest 1st Best 2ndBest 1st Best 2ndBest 1st Best
′a′ 0.2696 0.5200 0.3120 0.5200 0.3174 0.5200 0.3214 0.5200
′h′ 0.5183 0.1452 0.5558 -0.5695 0.5370 -0.8870 0.4903 -1.3645
′b′ 0.5185 0.1104 0.6000 0.1594 0.6104 0.1760 0.6182 0.1981
f(a) 0.5392 1.0400 0.6240 1.0400 0.6348 1.0400 0.6429 1.0400
h/f(a) 0.9610 0.0378 0.8908 -0.1481 0.8460 -0.2306 0.7626 -0.3548
As the price volatility decreases the manager’s optimal level of effort increases, while they hedge
less and the optimal compensation should comprise of a decrease in equity incentive portion. In
Case 2: First Best Scenario, the manager effort is observed; thus the effort exerted remains constant
with price volatility. The hedged amount increases, while the optimal compensation increases in
the equity incentive portion.
Table 2.5: Change in Variable Cost
c1 0.45 0.25 (Base Case)
2ndBest 1st Best 2ndBest 1st Best
Effort ′a′ 0.0866 0.3867 0.2696 0.5200
Hedge Amount ′h′ 0.1244 -0.2346 0.5183 0.1452
Incentive ′b′ 0.2238 0.1040 0.5185 0.1104
Average Quantity ′f(a′) 0.1731 0.7733 0.5393 1.0400
Hedge Raio ′h/f(a)′ 0.7188 -0.0454 0.9610 0.0376
Variable Cost, c1, changes from 0.25 to 0.45. As c1 increases the manager’s optimal level of effort
decreases while they hedge less and the optimal compensation should comprise of a decrease in
equity incentive portion under the Case 1: 2nd Best Scenario.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Application in aligning Cor-




Risk averse managers tends to overhedge (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, 1986; Smith
and Stulz, 1985). To examine how the hedging decision can be aligned between
shareholders and managers, I develop a theoretical model in the previous chapter
that examines the factors that optimizes both executive compensation and hedging
strategy. The model also shows how the divergent corporate hedging incentives
can be mitigated in practice by using executive compensation. In this chapter I
empirically test the validity of the theoretical model predictions obtained from the
last chapter with US oil and gas firm data and find in general, the model predictions
are supported by empirical data.
The relationship between hedge ratio and executive compensation has previously
been documented in literatures from Tufano (1996), Prendergast (2002), and Core,
Guay and Larcker (2003). Empirical research such as Rogers (2002) and Rajgopal
and Shevlin (2002) indicates that there is a relationship between risk management
and managerial incentive. While, Chen, Jin, and Wen (2011) extend on past liter-
ature and examine empirically the endogenous relationship between executive com-
pensation and hedging decisions, and the effects on firm value. However, the use
of executive compensation to reduce the managers’ overhedging tendency has not
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been studied. As suggested by the theoretical model in the previous chapter, this
agency problem can be mitigated by deploying different compensation schemes under
varying economic environments.
To examine the validity of the various model predictions in practice, this chap-
ter goes beyond the theoretical model in the previous chapter and empirically tests
model predictions: (i) hedging decision is negatively correlated with executive com-
pensation, which is consistent with studies from Tufano (1996) and Chen, Jin, and
Wen (2011), (ii) price volatility is negatively related to hedging, (iii) variable cost is
negatively related to hedging, and (iv) risk aversion is negatively related to hedging.
The first model prediction from the previous chapter suggests that as equity-
based incentive pay increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases. This is supported
by Chen, Jin, and Wen (2011) which shows evidence supporting this model finding.
Their study focuses on the oil and gas industry, while taking into account the en-
dogeneity between hedging and executive risk-taking incentives; they find significant
negative correlation between the hedging incentives and executive compensation.
While, Tufano (1996) also finds equity-based executive compensation is negatively
related to hedging.
The other model predictions suggest that price volatility and variable cost (gross
margin) are negatively (positively) related to hedging. Although their relationship is
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not directly examined in Brown and Toft (2002), these factors have been documented
to affect the hedging decision. Their study shows that the decision on how firms
should hedge is affected by the price volatility the firm faces and also the correlation
between price and profit margin.
Furthermore, there is evidence in past literature supporting the last model pre-
diction, which predicts that while risk aversion increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases. For example, Tufano (1996) finds that hedging is generally negatively
associated with the tenure of firm executives. While Tenure is often seen as a proxy
for executive risk aversion, as executive wealth is more invested in the firm with
increased tenure.
Beginning in January 1997, annual 10K filings are required to include risk-
management activities, including the nominal amount of hedge that was not pre-
viously available nor widely used in many related research studies. Thus, the model
predictions can be empirically tested against a sample of U.S. oil and gas firm data.
The use of the oil and gas sector allows for the control of market risk faced by each
firm, and to focus hedging activity on commodity hedges. Firms are required to dis-
close both the nominal amount hedged and the annual production, which collectively
allow for the examination of the percentage of production hedged.
Consistent with Core and Guay (2002), the executive risk-incentive compensation
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is measured by delta following value-increasing incentives. The theoretical model in
the previous chapter is based on linear derivatives, while the empirical test is based
on the general case which includes both the aforementioned derivatives to examine
if the model prediction is valid. As the companies in the sample use both linear and
non-linear derivatives to hedge their price risk.
In this chapter, to test the validity of the previous chapter’s results, OLS regres-
sions are used to show the linear relationships between the economic factors and the
hedging decision while taking into account the executive’s incentive pay. The empir-
ical testing reveals that in general, the model predications are in line with empirical
evidence.
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section includes a brief description
of the model prediction. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 shows the
empirical analysis of model prediction and results. Concluding remarks are provided
in Section 3.5.
3.2 Model Findings and Prediction
The previous chapter develops a theoretical model to examine the agency prob-
lem surrounding the corporate hedging decision between shareholders and managers,
where the managers have been documented to over-hedge. The model examines
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two hedging scenarios; the observable case and the hidden information case. In the
observable case the shareholder makes the hedging decision, while, in the hidden
information case, the manager makes the hedging decision. The model compares the
two cases and shows that the agency problem is more pronoun when (i) the manger’s
risk aversion is higher, (ii) the price volatility is low, and (iii) the variable cost is
high. The model further suggests that the optimal compensation scheme should be
comprised of a lower portion of equity-based incentive when Manager’s risk aversion
is high, when price volatility in high, or when variable cost is high. In this chap-
ter, I preform empirical testing of the following model predictions from the previous
chapter against firm data to analyse the model validity.
Model Prediction 1 : When incentive pay increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases
Model Prediction 2 : When price volatility increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases, while price volatility have a negative relation with equity-based incentive
Model Prediction 3 : When risk aversion increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases, while risk aversion have a negative relation with equity-based incentive
Model Prediction 4 : When variable cost increases, the optimal hedge ratio
decreases, while variable cost have a negative relation with equity-based incentive
These predictions are tested against empirical data in the following section.
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3.3 Data
Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp data was used to test the theoretical model
findings. This set of data provides information on executive compensation on over
2,500 companies and more than 24,000 executives. Focusing on the oil and gas
industry in particular, only companies with NAICS code 211 from years 2011 and
2014 in the sample are included. The advantages in using the oil and gas industry are
(i) the oil and gas price exposure can be identified, (ii) the reserves and productions
are disclosed in the financial statements, and (ii) the commodity risk is easily hedged
with derivatives sold on the exchange.
3.3.1 Incentive Pay
Consistent with past empirical research, delta is used to measure the incentive pay.
The estimation of delta follows Core and Guay’s (2002) approach. Delta measures
the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1 percent change in a firm’s stock
price. It calculates the executives’ value-increasing based on their stock and option
holdings. Delta is comprised of two components, (i) share delta and (ii) option delta.
Share delta represents the number of shares multiplied with the share price, which
is then multiplied by ’0.01’. Option delta uses the Black-Scholes Model to calculate
option price, which includes the use of data on exercise price, ex-date, volatility,
53
dividend yield, and risk-free rate. It also examines the amount of options vested and
unvested (in the money unexercised exercisable/unexercisable options). Adding the
two components gives the value of delta. Refer to Core and Guay (2002) for complete
description on delta calculation.






Risk aversion is difficult to model. In past literature, tenure, age, gender and wealth
were often associated with risk aversion. Thus, CEO’s tenure and age data collected
from ExecuComp Data were used (iii) it as proxies for absolute risk aversion for the
model testing. Risk taking has commonly been negatively associated CEO tenure,
age, gender and wealth. This risk-averse arises because of the non-diversified human
capital investment. Two proxies are used for risk-aversion in the testing, CEO tenure
and age. The CEO tenure is estimated by taking the difference between the year-
end date, and the date they become CEO. Due to the low amount of executives
and CEO’s in opposite genders, risk aversion cannot be proxy by gender and the
information on wealth of the executives are linked to compensation.
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3.3.3 Hedge Ratio
In January 1997 the Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR 48) was released
which requires firms to disclose Derivative Instrument and Quantitative Information
about market risk. As a result, this allows for the examination of hedging activities
on the firm. The sampled firms typically have commodity hedges on Crude Oil,
Natural Gas Liquid, and Natural Gas. This data is manually collected through the
firm’s 10-K that is available for download on Edgar. The 10-K’s provide the types of
derivatives used, the notion amount hedge and the production for the year. The 10-
Ks separate different risks that are being hedged; to test the model, focus is placed on
the commodity risk hedges that are measured in various units (Bcf, Mbbl, MMbtu,
MMgal, Boe) that are manually converted to Millions of Barrel Equivalent(MMBoe).
Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquid, and Natural Gas are then combined before samples
are taken thereafter. The samples are then winsorized to 1th percentile and 95th
percentiles, resulting in 34 companies and 685 observations. The majority of the
companies use both forwards and options, however, if companies were to choose only
one method of hedging, it would be the linear contract (i.e. forwards). Tables 3.1
to Table 3.4 summarizes the number of firms that uses linear, non-linear, or both
derivatives. The combined notional amount of different types of hedging is used to
estimate the hedge ratio. The hedge ratio is estimated by taking the total volume
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No 2 3 5
 Yes 7 22 29






No 3 1 4
 Yes 6 24 30






No 1 1 2
 Yes 6 26 32






No 4 1 5
 Yes 6 22 28
Total 10 23 33
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3.3.4 Volatility
Price volatility is the simple average of crude oil and natural gas, as most companies
in the sample produces both in various portions. This annualized price volatility
was calculated for each year (2011 to 2014) by taking the standard deviation of the
change in percentage daily spot prices multiplied by the square root of the trading
days in any given year (assumed 252 days) for crude oil and natural gas. The price
volatility in crude oil alone ranged from 23% to 35% between 2011 to 2014.
%4 S = St − St−1
St−1
PriceV ol = (σ%4S)(252
1/2)
3.3.5 Controls and Variable Cost
S&P’s Compustat North America Annual Fundamental Data contains company fi-
nancial, statistical, and marketing information. The variable cost is estimated using
the one minus gross margin of the company. The companies report total revenue and
cost of good sold. The gross margin is calculated by taking the difference between
the total revene and cost of good sold, this is then divided by the total revenue. The
gross margin is a percentage of each dollar of revenue that the company retains as
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gross profit, while one minus gross margin is the variable cost. Therefore, the proxy
for variable cost (’VC’) was obtained by taking one minus gross margin.
V C = 1− [Total Revenue− Cost of Good Sold
Total Revenue
]
The data on location, firm size, leverage and capital expenditure ’Capexp’ was
extracted for each company, these were then used as control variables in the empirical
model. The firm size would affect hedging as larger firms tend to hedge than more
than small firms. This size effect is proxy by log total asset. Leverage affects firm’s
capital structure, which in turn may be related to its value. Leverage would be
measured by debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt, scaled by total assets.
Capex is the net capital expenditure scaled by total assets. The location of the
company might also play a role in hedging ratio due to transportation costs, where
a city variable would need to be included to control for this.
3.3.6 Summary Statistics
Below is the summary statistics of the variables.
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics:
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
hedge ratio 111 0.4842 0.2657 0 1.0240
deltamean 115 202.2711 269.2205 6.4668 1720.6930
VarS 120 0.3345 0.0522 0.2471 0.3842
VC 112 0.4379 0.4134 0.1275 4.1980
3.4 Empirical Analysis of Model Prediction and Results
To test model predictions, the following empirical models was examined. The first
prediction suggests that ’when incentive pay increases the optimal hedge ratio de-
creases’. This prediction is in line with previous studies. When incentive pay in-
creases, the manager’s pay is more linked to equity and options. With increase risk
the optionvalue increases and it also gives an upside potential/benefit for equity
holders. As a result, with more equity-based pay, the manager is more motivated to
increase the risk of firm (because doing so will increase the manager’s equity-based
pay). To increase the risk of the firm, the manager will reduce the hedge ratio in
the firm because less hedging will increase firm risk. If the prediction is accurate β1
should be negative and significant in equation 3.4.1.




+ β2Controlsit + εit (3.4.1)
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# Obs 95 86
R2 0.201 0.161
t statistic in parentheses, *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
From Table 3.6 , deltamean is negative and significant. Therefore, the results from
the empirical testing were in-line with the model prediction (i.e. when incentive pay
increases the optimal hedge ratio decreases). This is because executives are often
paid for the risk they take, and when some of the risks are hedged, the incentive pay
would decrease. This is consistent with findings in Tufano (1996), Rogers (2002),
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) Supanvanij and Strauss (2006) Chen, Jin, and Wen
(2011).
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The size effect and capital expenditure was not significant. The model did not
produce the same result when the CEO’s delta was examined in isolation. This
could be because the CEO pay is very noisy as compared to the average delta across
executives at the same firm, which would otherwise produce a much more reliable
result. Consistent with Graham and Rogers (2002), the empirical model result show
that firms with higher leverage will hedge more.
The second model prediction is: ’when price volatility increases the optimal hedge
ratio decreases, and the compensation scheme will have a lower incentive portion’.
Applying the empirical model below, if the prediction stands β1 will be significant
and negative.
Hedge ratioit = αi + β1V olatilityt + β2Controlsit + εit (3.4.2)




+ β2V olatilityt + β3Controlsit + εit (3.4.3)
From Table 3.7, it is observed that both the coefficients for delta and price volatil-
ity was significant and negative suggesting that our model prediction holds. When
price volatility increases, the hedge ratio decreases. This is surprising as the hedging
ratio would be expected to increase when the price is volatile. A possible explana-
tion might be that the relationship between price volatility and average incentive pay
(deltamean) is negative, suggesting that in a volatile price environment the company
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PriceVol -0.980* -0.960* -1.015* -0.969
(-2.18) (-2.06) (-2.27) (-1.92)
Size -0.00482 0.00486 -0.0105 -0.00982
(-0.20) (0.21) (-0.52) (-0.51)
Capexp 0.609* 0.678* 0.750** 0.727*
(2.1) (2.42) (-2.89) (-2.63)






constants 0.744* 0.614* 0.711** 0.584*
(2.55) (2.08) (-2.63) (-2.11)
# Obs 106 102 107 96
R2 0.136 0.183 0.143 0.224
t statistic in parentheses, *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
compensates the executive with less incentive pay. On the other hand, the relation-
ship between hedge ratio and incentive pay is also negative, this therefore counteracts
the effect of price volatility on hedge ratio. Price volatility varied significantly be-
tween 2011 and 2014, and the results may have been stronger if the data spanned
over a longer period of time. In additionally, the relationship between price volatil-
ity and average incentive pay (deltamean) was negative but not significant in the
empirical data.
Model prediction three postulated: ’when risk aversion increases, the optimal
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hedge ratio decreases and the compensation scheme will have a lower incentive por-
tion’. The risk aversion of the executive cannot be observed as it is hard to proxy.
However, as explained in prior sections, a CEO’s tenure and age is used to proxy
for this risk aversion. If the model prediction is correct, β1 and β2 and β3 would be
negative and significant.






Hedge ratioit = αi+β1deltait+β2CEOtenureit+β3ageit+β4Controlsit+εit (3.4.5)
Measuring risk-aversion is difficult, here CEO tenure and age were used to proxy
risk-aversion. Even though both proxies for risk aversion, CEO tenure and age,
are significant, but the coefficient for CEO tenure is not as predicted by the model.
According to the model prediction with increased risk aversion, there is a tendency for
the hedge ratio to decrease, and compensation should have a lower incentive portion,
thus the coefficient CEO tenure should be negative. This result might be due to
the poor proxy for risk-aversion and minimum data available. In addition to CEO
tenure, the mean tenure across executives in each companies were tested but yielded
the same result. There is a negative relationship between ’Deltamean’ and CEO
tenure which suggests when risk aversion is high, there would be a lower incentive
pay portion, this relationship was not statistically significant from the empirical data.
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Additional to tenure, risk-aversion can also be proxy by wealth, however the wealth
of the manager cannot be measured and part of the wealth was captured in the
variable ’Deltamean’ in the form of executive compensation.






















# Obs 86 86
R2 0.277 0.268
t statistic in parentheses, *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
Finally, for the last model prediction:’when price variable cost increases, the opti-
mal hedge ratio decreases, and the compensation scheme will have a higher incentive
portion’. If this is the case, then β1 should be significant and negative and β2 should
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VC -0.186 -0.128 -0.0409
(-1.16) (-0.77) (-0.30)
City 0.0139 0.0155 0.0191*
(1.69) (1.92) (2.44)
B2M -0.0882 -0.0681 -0.0529
(-1.83) (-1.25) (-1.03)
Size -0.0486 -0.0675* -0.0447
(-1.42) (-2.01) (-1.55)
Capexp -0.458 -0.409 0.143
(-1.12) (-0.97) (0.37)
Leverage 0.670 0.770 1.456*
(1.00) (1.15) (2.19)
Constant 1.145** 1.216** 0.744*
(2.79) (2.92) (2.01)
# Obs 82 82 92
R2 0.2257 0.1866 0.1803
t statistic in parentheses, *p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001
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be significant and positive.




+ β2V Cit + β3Controlsit + εit (3.4.6)
From Table 3.9, the coefficient of the variable cost, ′V C ′, is negative which follows
the model prediction that: ’the hedge ratio decreases when variable cost increases’.
The coefficient of ′V C ′ is not significant in the regressions, however the relationship
in general is in the correct direction and the significance could possiblity improve
with additional years of data. An alternative measure of variable cost can also be
explored, such as variable cost as a proportion of total cost, which should produce
the same relationship with hedge ratio. The relationship between variable cost and
average incentive pay (deltamean) is negative, which suggests that when variable
cost is high, there would be a lower incentive pay portion (this relationship is also
insignificant in the empirical data).
3.5 Conclusion
The theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 was empirically tested to validate
model results. The theoretical model focuses on the linear financial derivatives set-
ting, while the model prediction holds empirically with both linear and non-linear
financial derivatives. In practice, managers select their level of effort and make the
hedging decisions; therefore the theoretical model results comparing the observable
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case (best solution), to the hidden information case (second best solution), cannot
be tested empirically due to the absence of a control group. With consideration of
empirical data from oil and gas companies, the testable results of the theoretical
model suggest that (i) when incentive pay increases, the optimal hedge ratio de-
creases, (ii) when price volatility increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, with a
negative relationship between price volatility and equity-based incentive, (iii) when
risk aversion increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, with a negative relation-
ship between risk aversion and equity-based incentive, and (iv) when variable cost
increases, the optimal hedge ratio decreases, with a negative relationship between
variable cost and equity-based incentive.
This chapter finds empirical evidence supporting these predictions. First, the
empirical test shows that there is a negative relationship between hedging and in-
centive pay, which supports the prediction that when incentive pay increases, the
optimal hedge ratio decreases. Second, the paper finds a negative relationship be-
tween hedging and volatility, with a negative relationship between incentive pay and
volatility. This is in line with the second prediction when price volatility increases,
the optimal hedge ratio decreases. Third, the empirical results shows a negative rela-
tionship between hedging and risk aversion when using age as a proxy, but a positive
relationship when using tenure as a proxy. In the previous literature, age and tenure
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has been used as a proxy, however the low evidence on the relationship between
hedging and risk aversion can be attributed to poor proxy. There is also a negative
relationship between incentive pay and risk aversion that supports the theoretical
prediction. Lastly, the results show a negative relationship between hedging and
variable cost, and a negative relationship between incentive pay and variable cost.
The empricial model presents endogeneity issues as all regressions are performed with
contemporaneously observed variables. To reduce the impact of endogeneity, inde-
pendent variables can be lagged. However, the empirical models in this chapter were
mainly used to test the theoretical model and the relationship between the variables.
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Chapter 4




This chapter introduces a new approach for modelling and forecasting the West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices. We estimate the WTI crude oil prices using
a convolution model of two stationary processes and, alternatively, a mixed causal-
noncausal autoregressive (MAR) model. This approach allows us to accommodate
the multimodality, heavy tails and various asymmetric local trends observed in the
WTI data distribution, which was not explored in previous literatures. The long-
run relationships between the Ontario consumer price index (OCPI), Ontario energy
price index (OEP) and the WTI series are established by using the cointegration
analysis. Then, we can use the WTI crude oil price forecasts to predict the Ontario
price indexes (OCPI and OEP) by exploiting the long-run relationships between the
Ontario consumer and energy price indexes.
To illustrate the dynamics of comovements between the OEP, OCPI and WTI,
Figure 4.1 displays each monthly series recorded between January 2000 to December
20187, where the WTI series is expressed in US Dollars and the price indexes are
expreseed in Canadian Dollars with the base year 2002:
[Insert Figure 4.1: Dynamics of OCPI, OEP and WTI crude oil price]
In Figure 4.1 we observe that the OCPI series is upward trending and smooth, while
7https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1810000413
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the OEP series shows both a global trend and local trends and spikes. In general, the
global trend of the OEP series is parallel to that of the OCPI and the local trends
and spikes in both the series of OEP and OCPI indexes seem to occur at the same
time as those observed in the trajectory of the WTI crude oil prices (WTI). The
WTI series does not display a global trend, but is characterized by local trends and
spikes.
The first contribution of this chapter is to model and forecast the WTI crude
oil prices and estimate the long-run relationships between the Ontario price indexes
(OCPI and OEP), adjusted for the exchange rate, and the WTI crude oil prices. The
cointegration analysis provides the forecasts of the Ontario price indexes and WTI
crude oil prices. Alternatively, the forecasts of Ontario price indexes can be obtained
as functions of the WTI crude oil price forecasts combined with the forecast of the
stationary series of departures from the long run equilibrium.
In addition, the WTI crude oil price process is modelled as a convolution of
stationary causal and noncausal autoregressive processes. This model is parsimonious
and accommodates the local trends and spikes in the trajectory of the oil price
process as well as the bi-modality of its sample distribution. The bi-modality in the
distribution of the WTI crude oil price data evidenced in this paper seems to be
disregarded in the existing literature.
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The forecast of the WTI crude oil prices can also be obtained from the mixed
causal -noncausal model of WTI crude oil prices. We explore this approach, which
allows us for comparing two methods of forecasting for noncausal processes devel-
oped by Lanne, Luoto and Saikkonen (2012) and Gourieroux and Jasiak (2016). A
comparison of these two methods in an empirical application is an additional contri-
bution of this paper. A simulation-based comparison of the two forecasting methods
for noncausal processes is given in Voisin, Hecq (2019). Given the WTI crude oil
price forecast and the estimated long-term relationships, the Ontario price indexes
can be forecast as well, as functions of the WTI crude oil price forecast.
There exists a large body of literature on oil price forecasting. A commonly used
heuristic model for oil price prediction is the no-change model, which is also used in
the literature as a benchmark for comparison of forecast performance.
For example, the existing oil price forecasting literature provides evidence that
the structural models of real oil prices outperform the no-change forecast at short
horizons (Alquist, Kilian, and Vigfusson, 2013 and Baumeister and Kilian, 2012,
2014, 2015, among others). The forecast combination model proposed by Baumeister
and Kilian (2015), includes six models, in which only four models appears to be
essential to price prediction: global oil market VAR model, model based on non-oil
commodity prices, model based on oil future spreads and time-varying product spread
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model. They construct an inverse mean squared prediction error MSPE weight based
on recent forecasting performance of each model. They then allocate larger weight
to models in the combination forecasts that have smaller MSPE date t. The model
use a predictor’s lags of the real price of oil, current oil spot prices and oil future
prices, current spot prices in the market for refined products and current and lagged
data on economic fundamentals. They find placing equal weights on all forecasting
models produces the most accurate forecasts. In particular, forecasts obtain by the
combination forecasts from (i) global oil market VAR model, (ii) model based on
non-oil commodity prices, (iii) model based on oil future spreads, and (iv) time-
varying product spread model are systemically more accurate than the no change
forecast at horizon 1 month to 18 months.
Li, Xu and Tang (2016) introduce sentiment analysis, a useful big data analysis
tool, to understand the relevant information of on-line news and formulate an oil
price trend prediction method with sentiment.
Gao and Lei (2017) propose a novel approach for crude oil price prediction based
on a machine learning paradigm called stream learning. The main advantage of
the stream learning approach is that the prediction model can capture the changing
pattern of oil prices since the model is continuously updated whenever new oil price
data are available. In the literature, a model trained with artificial neural networks
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(ANN), is a classical machine learning model for oil price prediction (Yu et al.,
2008; Kulkarni and Haidar, 2009). Li, Shang and Wang (2019) apply deep learning
techniques to crude oil forecasting, and to extract hidden patterns within online news
media using a convolutional neural network (CNN). Chen, He and Tso (2017) use
the deep learning model to capture the unknown complex nonlinear characteristics
of the crude oil price
Snudden (2018) uses a high-order VAR (p=24) and proposes the method of tar-
geted growth rate filtering using spectral analysis , which is a modification of the
standard forecasting method. The lags in growth rate transformations are chosen in
order to target lower frequencies. The method removes high frequencies and empha-
sizes certain low frequencies which correspond to particular forecast horizons. Li,
Xu and Tang (2016) introduce sentiment analysis, a useful big data analysis tool, to
understand the relevant information of on-line news and formulate an oil price trend
prediction method with sentiment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data. Section 4.3
examines the comovements between the Ontario price indexes and the cointegrating
relationships between the WTI crude oil prices and the Ontario price indexes. Sec-
tion 4.4 presents the convolution model and the alternative mixed causal-noncausal
autoregressive (MAR) specifications. Section 4.5 discusses the forecasting from MAR
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models and the application of the available methods. Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
Additional results are provided in Appendices 1 and 2.
4.2 Data Description
This section describes the three series of 228 monthly observations on the OCPI, OEP
and the WTI crude oil prices observed over the period January 2000 to December
2018.
Ontario CPI and Ontario Energy Price Index
The data on OCPI and OEP are provided by Statistics Canada 8. Our sample
contains monthly data from January 2000 to December 2018, which is seasonally
non-adjusted and consists of 228 observations.
The OCPI compares the cost of a static or equivalent quantity and quality fixed
basket of goods and services purchased by consumers, therefore the OCPI reflects a
pure price change indicating the general level of inflation. The goods and services’
price movements in the OCPI are weighted according to the relative importance
to the total expenditures of consumers. Each good or service is an element in the
basket, and price movements of these elements are assigned a share in the basket
that is proportional to the total consumption expenditure. Amongst the elements in
8The source of monthly data is the Statistics Canada website:
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1810000401 from table 18-10-0004-
01 (formerly CANSIM 326-0020)
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the ’basket of goods’ is energy. The OCPI index measures the inflation based on the
price increases of goods in a predetermined ‘basket of goods’. Consumers typically
switch between products as the relative prices of goods change. Thus, the price index
is based on a fixed-basket as opposed to the cost-of-living.
The base period of the CPI was chosen as 2002, which means the CPI in 2002
is set equal to $100. The change allows the percentage changes between any two
periods to remain the same as it is an arithmetic conversion, which alters the index
levels.
The OCPI series shows a global upward sloping trend in Figure 4.1.
The aggregate Ontario Energy Price Index is one of the components of OCPI
which includes: ’electricity’, ’natural gas’, ’fuel oil and other fuels’, ’gasoline’, and
’fuel, parts and accessories for recreational vehicles’. All the prices listed within
energy are also consumer prices. The fuel oil data is collected at least once a year.
The energy does not seem to include transportation cost, as it is listed as a separate
element of OCPI. The base year for Ontario Energy Price Index is 2002, which is
consistent with the base year for OCPI.
The dynamic of the OEP series shows a global upward sloping trend and local
trends and spikes in Figure 4.1.
WTI Crude Oil Prices
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The monthly WTI crude oil price data from January 2000 to December 2018 (in
US dollars per barrel) are provided by the U.S. Energy Administration (EIA) 9. The
WTI crude oil is produced in Texas and Southern Oklahoma. It is often used as
a benchmark for oil pricing and serves as a reference point for pricing a number of
other crude streams traded in the Cushing, Oklahoma spot market. The price of oil
is the market spot price, i.e. the price of a one time open market transaction for
immediate delivery of a specific quantity of product at a specific location where the
commodity is purchased ”on the spot” at a current market rate. The monthly data
provided by EIA are computed as the unweighted average of the daily closing spot
prices over a specific month.
The oil series shows two significant troughs due to considerable crude oil price
drops in years 2008 and 2014. The first price drop in 2008 coincides with the begin-
ning of the economic recession tiggered in part by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
filing on September 15,2018. This economic recession caused strain in the banking
system and the demand for oil fell. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) subsequently announced a 16 percent reduction in production
over 8 months with the intent to help stabilize oil prices.
The second price drop occured after Thanksgiving 2014, following the period
9https://www.eia.gov
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between January 2011 and June 2014 when oil prices were relatively stable. A decline
in oil prices started in June 2014 due to an increased supply of oil prompted by a
technological advancement that enabled the ”shale” oil production. However, the
increased supply was not matched by the anticipated increase in oil demand. At
the same time, OPEC countries maintained their output at a constant level, thus
increasing the overall supply. In the second quarter of 2014, OPEC changed its policy
and decreased the production, causing a drop in oil prices, which is observed in the
dataset after October 2014.
The monthly OCPI and OEP Index data from January 2000 to December 2018
are expressed in Canadian dollars. In order to establish the relation between the
series and the WTI crude oil expressed in US Dollars, we need to use a common
currency of reference. Therefore, we adjust the OEP and OCPI indexes for the
CAD/USD exchange rate to make them comparable.
Exchange Rate
The exchange rate is obtained through the Bloomberg terminal ”USDCAD BGN
Curncy” series. The Bloomberg series of exchange rates is displayed in Figure 4.12,
Appendix 2.
The monthly exchange rates are representative of the Bloomberg Generic Com-
posite rate (BGN). It is a representation based on indicative rates contributed by
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market participants. The data is not based on any actual market trades. BGN is a
pricing algorithm that produces indications of bid and ask quotes that are derived
from hundreds of quality sources, including indicative and executable price quotes
from money-center and regional banks, broker-dealers, inter-dealer brokers, and trad-
ing platforms. BGN is designed to track executable bid/ask rates and to be resistant
to manipulation by market participants. To adjust for the difference in currency
between OCPI, OEP and WTI crude oil price data we used the monthly mid price
exchange rate from Bloomberg BGN rates between January 2000 to December 2018
. The Mid Price is the average of the Bid Price and Ask Price. If there is no bid
value or ask value provided, the mid price will simply be the value provided.
The exchange rate series does not have a global trend. It shows a local downward
sloping trend in the first part of the sampling period and a local upward trend in the
second part of the sampling period. It also shows a spike around the crisis of 2008.
Exchange Rate Adjusted Series
The exchange rate adjusted series of OCPI and OEP indexes are displayed in
Figure 4.2 below along with the WTI crude oil prices:
[Insert Figure 4.2: Dynamics of transformed OCPI, OEP and WTI crude oil
price]
After adjusting for the exchange rate, the dynamics of OCPI and OEP series
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change. The global upward trends in these series have been flattened because of the
patterns revealed in the exchange rate dynamics. The most noticeable changes are in
the OCPI dynamics. The OCPI series no longer has a smooth trajectory resembling
a linear trend and becomes more volatile with local trends. Moreover, the local
trends in the OCPI and the OEP series occur at the same time as those in the oil
price series. The global trends in OEP and OCPI series remain parallel, as before
the adjustment for exchange rates.
The QQ-plot in Figure 4.13 shows that the sample quantiles of OCPI differ from
those of a normally distributed stationary variable. This could be due to the fact
that the series is either non-normally distributed, or non-stationary, or both. More
specifically, either the sample quantiles have not converged to the quantiles of the
limiting distribution, causing deviations from the line, or they have converged and
the deviations are caused by the non-normal distribution of the series, such as the
multimodality and thin or thick tails. The QQ-plot in Figure 4.14 shows that a
similar conclusion can be drawn for the OEP series as well. The next section examines
the stationarity of the series.
4.3 Dynamic analysis
Let us now examine the dynamics of the adjusted series. The OCPI and OEP
series display parallel global trends, which suggest nonstationarity due to a possible
80
presence of a unit root. The WTI series does not have a global trend and features
local trends and spikes. Nevertheless, in the early time series literature this behaviour
was called ”meandering” and attributed to unit root dynamics as well.
A simple method of testing for stationarity can be linked to the test of normality,
as suggested in the previous Section. This method is used in the natural sciences.
For example, the stationarity of encephalographic signals is often inferred from the
results of the Shapiro–Wilk test for Gaussianity [see Bender et al. 1992].
Let us now test the variables of interest for normality by using the Shapiro-Wilk
test and its simplified version the Shapiro-Francia test. The implicit null hypothesis
is that each series is normally distributed and stationary while the implicit alternative
hypothesis is that each series is either non-normally distributed or non-stationary.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show the outcomes of the tests.
Table 4.1: Shapiro-Wilk W’ Test
Obs W ′ V ′ z Prob > z
OCPI 228 0.92486 12.568 5.862 0.00000
OEP 228 0.94285 9.560 5.229 0.00000
Oil 228 0.95488 7.547 4.681 0.00000
Table 4.2: Shapiro-Francia W’ Test
Obs W ′ V ′ z Prob > z
OCPI 228 0.92930 12.878 5.329 0.00001
OEP 228 0.94715 9.625 4.722 0.00001
Oil 228 0.95770 7.704 4.258 0.00001
Both tests reject the null hypothesis in the OCPI, OEP and WTI crude oil prices
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at the significance level 1%. This outcome is explored further to determine whether
the series are non-stationary.
Unit Root Tests
We proceed to test each series for unit root, using the DF (Dickey-Fuller) and
ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) tests. The null hypothesis H0 is that the given
series has a unit root and the alternative HA is that the series is stationary. Tables
4.3, 4.4 and 4.8 below test the null hypothesis H0 : γ = 0 against HA : γ < 0 in the
three following specifications:
∆pt = γpt−1 + vt
∆pt = µ+ γpt−1 + vt
∆pt = µ+ δt+ γpt−1 + vt
where t is a sequence of time indexes, t = 1, ..., 228, pt is the series of price indexes
or prices considered, and process vt is a strong White Noise, with finite moments of
order 4, which may not necessarily be Normally distributed.
The results of the Dickey Fuller test with no constant for the three series are
given in Table 4.3 below:
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Table 4.3: Dickey Fuller Test with no constant
Obs coefficient τ
OCPI 227 0.0009 0.487
OEP 227 0.0002 0.057
Oil 227 -0.0025 -0.459
Note: All three series exhibit unit roots
The results of the Dickey Fuller test with a constant for the three series are given
in Table 4.4 below:
Table 4.4: Dickey Fuller Test with Constant
Obs constant coefficient τ
OCPI 227 1.73285 -0.0163793 -1.732
OEP 227 2.80832 -0.0214907 -1.876
Oil 227 1.605374 -0.0242862 -1.788
All three series exhibit unit roots
Under the null hypothesis, the t-ratio is non-standard and its asymptotic distri-
bution is non-normal. Therefore, it is denoted by symbol τ . It is compared with the
critical values of the unit root test. We find that the unit root hypothesis cannot be
rejected in all three series at the significance level 5%. The results of the ADF with
constant are given in Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 below:
Table 4.5: Augmented Dickey Fuller OEP
Constant Coefficient L1 Coefficient LD Coefficient L2D Coefficient L3D τ Observations
2.704 -0.022    -1.876 227
(1.96) (-1.88)   
2.760 -0.022 0.119   -1.932 226
(1.99) (-1.93) (1.79)  
2.807 -0.023 0.110 0.079  -1.966 225
(2.00) (-1.97) (1.65) (1.18) 
2.987 -0.024 0.115 0.085 -0.031 -2.052 224
(2.11) (-2.05) (1.72) (1.26) (-0.46)
τ-statistic is reported in the parenthesis.
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Table 4.6: Augmented Dickey Fuller OCPI
Constant Coefficient L1 Coefficient LD Coefficient L2D Coefficient L3D τ Observations
1.733 -0.016    -1.732 227
(1.86) (-1.73)   
1.730 -0.016 -0.061   -1.701 226
(1.84) (-0.92) (-1.70)  
1.739 -0.016 -0.058 0.053  -1.705 225
(1.83) (-1.71) (-0.86) (0.80) 
1.831 -0.017 -0.054 0.050 -0.057 -1.767 224
(1.91) (-1.77) (-0.81) (0.75) (-0.84)
τ-statistic is reported in the parenthesis.
Table 4.7: Augmented Dickey Fuller WTI Crude Oil Prices
Constant Coefficient L1 Coefficient LD Coefficient L2D Coefficient L3D τ Observations
1.605 -0.024    -1.788 227
(1.75) (-1.79)   
1.957 -0.030 0.394   -2.443 226
(2.29) (-2.44) (6.39)  
2.128 -0.034 0.359 0.099  -2.637 225
(2.46) (-2.64) (5.43) (1.46) 
2.111 -0.033 0.364 0.124 -0.070 -2.535 224
(2.41) (-2.54) (5.49) (1.74) (-1.03)
τ-statistic is reported in the parenthesis.
The test results suggest that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected
at the significance level 5%. The outcomes of the DF tests with a constant and trend
are given in Table 4.8:
Table 4.8: Dickey Fuller Test with Trend
constant trend coefficient τ Obs
OCPI 1.754093 0.0001633 -0.0167924 -1.193 227
(1.63) (0.04) (-1.19)
OEP 2.806635 -0.0000289 -0.0214495 -1.315 227
(1.86) (-0.00) (-1.32)
Oil 1.656705 -0.0011774 -0.0229507 -1.494 227
(1.73) (-0.19) (-1.49)
t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. All three series exhibit unit roots
Table 4.9 shows the outcomes of the ADF test with a trend.
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Table 4.9: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test with Trend
constant trend coefficient L1 coefficient LD coefficient L2D τ Obs
OCPI 1.745804 0.0000498 -0.0165538 -0.0575078 0.0535956 -1.151 225
(1.59) (0.01) (-1.15) (-0.85) (0.79)
OEP 3.035848 0.0039103 -0.0286789 0.1151561 0.0843935 -1.719 225
(2.05) (0.49) (-1.72) (1.70) (1.24)
WTI Oil 1.96958 0.0036452 -0.0379302 0.3617519 0.1025899 -2.617 225
(2.18) (0.62) (-2.62) (5.45) (1.51)
t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. All three series exhibit unit roots
The results shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the significance
level 5% either. In the WTI series, the unit root hypothesis can be rejected at level
10%.
Common Trends Analysis
The evidence of unit root tests suggests that all series have a stochastic global
trend.
For the OEP and OCPI series, this result is consistent with the patterns displayed
in Figure 4.2. The OEP and OCPI series have a parallel upward sloping global trend,
resembling the dynamics of a pair of cointegrated variables. The presence of the
common trend follows from the construction of the price indexes and the fact that
the energy prices are included in the OCPI. Technically, the presence of unit roots
in both price indexes suggests that we can test for the common stochastic trend. If
the presence of the common stochastic trend is not rejected, we can establish a long
term relations between the Ontario price indexes using the cointegration approach.
To estimate the long-run relation between the OEP series and the consumer price
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index OCPI series, we regress the OEP on OCPI.
OEPt = β0 + β1OCPIt + et
ÔEP t = −39.047 + 1.610OCPIt (4.3.1)
The regression coefficient β1 has a standard error of 0.021 with a t-ratio of 75.82. To
check if the above regression represents a long-term relation rather than a spurious
regression, we examine the residual series , displayed in Figure 4.3.
[Insert Figure 4.3 : Departures from long-term relation of OCPI and OEP]
The residual seems stationary over time. To confirm this observation, we use
the cointegration test. The cointegration test performed on the residual, using the
Engle-Granger approach consists in testing the null hypothesis of the residuals being
non-stationary i.e. H0 : γ = 0 against HA : γ < 0 that the residuals are stationary.
The test is based on the model:
∆et = γet−1 + vt
where vt is a assumed to be a strong White Noise and the residuals êt of equation
(4.3.1) are used as the proxies of the true errors et. The Engle-Granger critical value
at the significance level 5% is -3.35, while the τ statistic for the γ coefficient, is
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-4.005. The results in Table 4.10 show that the regression of OEP on OCPI is valid
and represents a long-run relation.
Table 4.10: Cointegration Test
Coefficient τ
Regression -0.1412 -4.016
Residuals are stationary at probability level 5%
Let us now examine the relations between the Ontario price indexes and WTI
series. The evidence on the presence of a unit root in the WTI series is more difficult
to interpret. As shown in Figure 4.2 , the WTI series does not display a global
trend. Instead, it has short-lived local trends. As the local trends are short-lived,
the dynamics of the WTI does not resemble the behavior of stock prices or interest
rates, which are known to be non-stationary random walk processes. The WTI
resembles rather the behavior of the commodity price processes, which are modelled
in the recent literature as stationary processes with non-causal components.
We know that both Ontario price indexes are based on baskets that include oil
and depend on oil prices. As the weight of oil in the basket varies over time and
is consumer rather than producer price based, the econometric relationship in the
long run will reflect a complex accounting relationship. The evidence of a unit root
suggests that we can regress the price indexes on the WTI, and search for the presence
of a common trend. The problem is how to reconcile the lack of a global trend in
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the WTI with the upward global trends in the price indexes.
We first consider the relationship between the exchange rate adjusted OEP and
the WTI crude oil prices and regress the OEP on WTI. Due to the difference between
the global trends of OEP and WTI this relationship is invalid as the residuals of
the regression are non-stationary. More specifically, the residuals display an upward
sloping trend, displayed in Figure . The tests does not reject the unit root in residuals,
given the value of τ = −1.80.
In order to ”lift up” the WTI series, we can add a deterministic trend to the linear
relationship, by analogy to adding a deterministic trend to a cointegrating relation.
The regression estimated with a linear (deterministic) trend is:
OEPt = β0 + β1t+ β2WTIt + ut
ÔEP t = 41.6163 + 0.1700t+ 0.8905WTIt (4.3.2)
The regression coefficient β1 has a standard error of 0.007907 and t-ratio of 21.51.
The regression coefficient β2 has a standard error of 0.019468 and t-ratio of 45.74. We
perform the cointegration test on the residuals from equation (4.3.2) by estimating
∆ut = γut−1 + vt
and testing H0 : γ = 0 with residuals ût used as the proxies of errors ut. Table
4.11 below shows the results. We find that the τ statistic exceeds the Engle-Granger
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adjusted critical value at 5%. Accordingly, we can reject the unit root in the residuals
at level 5%. The residuals of regression (3.2) displayed in Figure 4.4 below are
stationary and the regression can be considered as a long-run relation between the
OEP and WTI series with a deterministic trend.
Table 4.11: Cointegration Test
Coefficient τ
Regression -0.19732 -4.818
Residuals are stationary at probability level 10%
[Insert Figure 4.4 : Rgression of OEP on oil prices - Residuals]
To compare the differences in global trends between the price indexes and the
WTI, we also regress the OCPI series on the WTI. Without a deterministic trend,
this regression is not valid either. The residuals of the regression of OCPI on WTI
without a deterministic trend displayed in Figure 4.6 show an upward sloping trend.10
The cointegration tests does not reject the unit root in the residuals with τ = −2.32.
The residuals of equation (4.3.1) êt [resp. residuals of equation (4.3.2) ût] can be
interpreted as a series of departures of the OEP and OCPI [resp. OEP and WTI]
series from the long run relations given in equation (4.3.1) [resp.(4.3.2)]. The sample
densities of these residuals are estimated and plotted in Figures 4.15, 4.17, Appendix
2. The qq-plots are given in Figures 4.16 and 4.18, Appendix 2. We observe that the
10The normality of errors is not required for the validity of cointegration analysis.
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residuals have distributions rather close to the Normal, although residual êt seems
to display some departures from Normality due to the thick right tail. Residual û
shows slight asymmetry in its distribution and a thin right tail.
The absence of a global trend in the WTI series and the presence of short-lived
local trends suggests that this series may indeed be stationary with a noncausal
dynamic, which is explored later in the text. The forecast of the stationary noncausal
WTI series would then be available and could be exploited to forecast the Ontario
price indexes.
Forecasting
The stationary residual series êt and ût are autocorrelated and can be estimated
by an ARMA model. These series represent stationary combinations of components
displaying various types of trend: global and local in terms of duration and stochastic,
and deterministic in terms of nature.
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 in Appendix 3 provide the estimates of simple ARMA(p,q)
models fitted to the series of residuals from equations (4.3.1) and (4.3.2). The au-
toregressive AR(2) models are found to provide the best fit for both series. Hence,
both series of residuals can be easily forecast using standard software, such as SAS
or STATA.
Then, the forecast of the WTI crude oil prices combined with the forecast of
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residual (4.3.2) provides a forecast of OEP as follows:
Let ŴTIT+1 denote the one step ahead out of sample forecast of the WTI crude
oil price and ûT+1 denote the one step ahead forecast of the error term provided by
the AR(2) model. We can use equation (4.3.2) to obtain the forecast of the energy
index based on the forecast of WTI crude oil price:
ÔEP T+1 = 41.6163 + 0.1700(T + 1) + 0.8905ŴTIT+1 + ûT+1
where et ÔEP T+1 denotes the one step ahead out of sample forecast of the Ontario
energy index. In practice, the regression parameters can be estimated locally by
rolling to capture the potential changes in the slope of the trend function:
ÔEP T+1 = θ0,T + θ1,T (T + 1) + θ2,T ŴTIT+1 + ûT+1
where θi,T , i = 0, 1, 2 denote the coefficients updated by rolling. This method can be
used for short term forecasting.
Next, we can forecast the OCPI series from equation (4.3.2) one step ahead out
of sample using the predicted energy index and residual ûT+1 as follows:
ÔCPIT+1 = 24.2528 + 0.621118ÔEP T+1 − 0.621118êT+1
.
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The above forecasts are not optimal in the sense that ÔEP T+1 and ÔCPIT+1 are
not equal to their conditional expectations, given the past values of the right hand
side series. However, the forecast is unbiased as the expected forecast error is 0. The
forecast error variance depends on the quality of the component forecasts and needs
to be examined in a simulation study.
The proposed approach resembles a simple neural network that combines two
layers of regressions. It is a simplified alternative to the Vector Error Correction
(VEC) model presented below.
The VEC Model
The specifications of the VEC model examined in this study are based on the
insights on common trends given earlier in this Section. The bivariate model of price
indexes with the current value of WTI as an explanatory variable provides the best
forecasts of Ontario price indexes. The VECX(2) model is specified as follows:
∆pt = const+ Πpt−1 + Φ∆pt−1 +WTIt + εt
where pt contains the series of OEPt and OCPIt, matrix Π = αβ
′ is of rank 1 and the
errors are a white noise process with finite moments up to order 4. The parameters
α1 = 0.513, α2 = 0.157 are both significant at 5%. The cointegrating vector β
′ =
[−0.927, 1] under the normalization with respect to OCPI. The coefficients on the
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WTI, as well as the lagged first difference of OEP, are statistically significant. The
detailed estimation results are provided in Appendix 3.
The out-of sample forecasts of Ontario price indexes at horizons from 1 up to 5
months are as follows:
Var. Obs Forecast St. Error 95% Conf. Int. Actual Residual
oep 224 128.553 4.641 119.455 , 137.650 128.139 -0.413
225 128.363 5.929 116.742, 139.985 127.514 -0.848
226 128.404 6.591 115.484, 141.323 122.140 -6.263
227 125.888 7.037 112.094, 139.682 114.654 -11.233
228 122.549 7.425 107.994, 137.104 108.089 -14.460
ocpi 224 104.166 2.612 99.046, 109.286 104.213 0.047
225 104.220 3.398 97.560, 110.881 104.738 0.518
226 104.289 4.049 96.353, 112.225 103.063 -1.226
227 103.655 4.612 94.614, 112.697 101.639 -2.016
228 102.933 5.124 92.890, 112.976 98.996 -3.937
The presence of WTIt improves the forecasts of price indexes. We observe that the
forecasts of OEPt worsen quickly with the forecast horizon, while the forecast of
OCPIt remains quite reliable.
Next, we model jointly the two Ontario price indexes and the WTI series. Under
this approach the three series satisfy a cointegrating relation with a linear trend.
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The model is the following VEC(2):




′ + Φ∆pwt−1 + εwt,
where pwt denotes the vector containing OEPt, OCPIt and WTIt, t denotes the
linear trend, matrix Π is of rank 1 and the errors are a white noise process with finite
moments up to order 4. The coefficients in vector α are 0.333, 0.089 and 0.461. The
α coefficients on OEP and WTI are statistically significant at 5%, while coefficient
αOCPI is not, due to its p-value of 0.06. The coefficients in the cointegrating vector β
are -0.483, 1, -0.122, under the normalization with respect to OCPI. The parameter
estimates are given in Appendix 3.
This trivariate VEC(2) specification provides the best forecasts of the WTI series
up to horizon 3, as compared with the VEC(2) model with matrix Π of rank 2
and a linear trend, which provides better forecasts of WTI at horizons 4 and 5
and is the second best WTI forecast provider. The forecasts of the Ontario prices
obtained from both trivariate VEC(2) models are worse than those obtained from
the VEXC(2) model with the WTI as an explanatory variable. However, the price
indexes help forecast the WTI.
The out-of-sample WTI forecasts at horizons 1 up to 5 from the trivariate VEC
model with 1 cointegrating vector and a linear trend are as follows:
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Obs Forecast St. Error 95% Conf. Int. Actual Residual er(NC)
224 70.946 4.575 61.978, 79.913 68.060 -2.886 -2.92
225 69.549 7.502 54.845, 84.253 70.230 0.680 -0.75
226 67.820 9.691 48.826, 86.815 70.750 2.929 -0.23
227 66.223 11.375 43.927, 88.519 56.960 -9.263 -14.02
228 64.909 12.759 39.901, 89.917 49.520 -15.389 -21.46
The last column shows the errors of a forecast based on the ”no-change” (NC)
method, which assumes that the best forecast of a future value is the last observed
one. We find that the VEC-based forecasts outperform the NC forecast one-step
ahead and in terms of the forecast MSE up to horizon 5. The MSE of the VEC
forecast is 67.915, while the MSE of the NC forecast is 133.246.
4.4 Estimation of Dynamic Oil Price Models
The unit root analysis suggests potential nonstationarity of the WTI crude oil price
series. However, the WTI series does not have an explosive behaviour, although
its ”meandering” can be interpreted as a nonstationary pattern due to a unit root,
according to the early time series literature. More recent literature however [see e.g
Perron (1989)] has revealed that the unit root tests have low power in applications to
processes with level shifts. In Section 2, we pointed out two major declines in the oil
prices, which may have led to spurious results of unit root test. Moreover, the unit
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root tests are flawed in applications to stationary recurrent processes with non-normal
distributions that display local trends [see, Gourieroux and Jasiak (2018)]. This is
because the unit root test does not distinguish between the stationary processes with
local trends and nonstationary processes with global trends. Hence, the unit root
tests tend to accept the null hypothesis in the presence of either type of trend.
In this section, we examine various models to find a suitable stationary repre-
sentation for the WTI crude oil price process. Let us first examine its distributional
properties while assuming its stationarity.
Table 4.12: Summary Statistics
count mean min max sd skewness kurtosis
WTI 228 62.010 19.39 133.88 26.79109 0.344 2.141
Table 4.13: Summary Statistics - quantiles of empirical density
1% 5% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 95% 99%
WTI 19.72 26.43 28.39 38.56 59.175 84.96 100.54 104.67 125.4
The summary statistics in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show that the sample
mean of WTI is 62.01, and the median is 59.17, respectively. The standard deviation
of WTI is 26.79 and the range is 114.49. respectively. Figure 4.7 below shows the
histogram of the Oil Price.
[Insert Figure 4.7: Histogram: WTI Crude Oil Price]
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The sample distribution reveals a bimodal pattern. We compare this distribution to
the Normal distribution in the quantile plot (QQ-plot) displayed in Figure 4.8 below.
[Insert Figure 4.8: Crude Oil - QQ Plot]
Figure 4.8 reveals departures of the WTI crude oil price from Normality due to
heavy tails, despite the low sample kurtosis value. Such a contradictory outcome can
arise in multimodal distributions. These finding motivates us to fit to the WTI crude
oil prices a stationary mixture model, to accommodate both the multimodality, and
heavy tails displayed in Figure 4.9 below:
[Insert Figure 4.9: Crude Oil - Hill Estimator]
Below, we explore the fit of the mixed causal-noncausal MAR models that can ac-
commodate various asymmetric local trends. As an alternative mixture specification,
we also explore a convolution model with causal and noncausal components.
All estimations reported below concern the process yt = oilt −median(oil). We
refer to this process as the ”demeaned” oil prices.
The behaviour of the demeaned series over time is displayed in Figure 4.10 below.
[Insert 4.10: Demeaned WTI Crude Oil Prices]
We observe that the series tends to revert to the level close to 0 over time. It displays
spikes and bubbles which are short lasting local trends with a growth phase followed
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by a sudden drop, like the one observed around observation 100 in Figure 4.8, for
example.
4.4.1 Noncausal Models
The noncausal processes have simple linear dynamics in the reverse time, while dis-
playing non-linearities in the calendar time. They can accommodate spikes and local
trends in the trajectory of a process, including the bubbles.
The mixed autoregressive causal-noncausal model is:
Φ(L)Ψ(L−1)yt = εt, (4.4.3)
where Φ(L) is the autoregressive polynomial in lag operator L of order r, Ψ(L−1) is
the autoregressive polynomial in lead operator L−1 of order s and errors εt are i.i.d.
Cauchy distributed variables with location 0 and scale coefficient γ. For stationarity,
we require both autoregressive polynomials to have roots outside the unit circle.
Let θ = [φ1, ...φr, ψ1, ..., ψs, γ]
′. We use the Approximate Likelihood Method
(AML) [Lanne, Saikkonnen(2011)] and maximize the log-likelihood function 11:
L(θ; y1, ....yT ) =
T−s−1∑
t=r+1
[−ln(π)− lnγ − ln(1 + (εt(θ)2/(γ2))];
11The standard error and t-ratio are asymptotically valid for the scale estimator γ only [Andrews
et.al (2009)]. The standard errors of the remaining coefficients tend to be overestimated by the
AML method.
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where εt denotes the error term from one of the specifications presented below. Let
us first, examine pure noncausal processes. These models with Cauchy distributed
errors can replicate the bubbles, i.e. the aforementioned local trends followed by
sudden bursts. First, we consider a Cauchy noncausal AR(1) (r=1, s=0).
yt = ψyt+1 + εt
It is estimated with an objective function value of 713.486537:
Parameters Estimates st error* t-ratio*
ψ 0.9894 0.0096 102.8088
γ 2.6200 0.2223 11.7821
We find that the autoregressive coefficient is close to 1. The root of the autoregressive
polynomial is 1.01.
Next, we consider the noncausal AR(2) process (r=2, s=0).
yt = ψ1yt+1 + ψ2yt+2 + εt
It is estimated with an objective function value of 711.17401:
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Parameters Estimates st error* t-ratio*
ψ1 1.1217 0.0582 19.2673
ψ2 -0.1328 0.0576 -2.3048
γ 2.5812 0.2183 11.8225
The roots of the autoregressive polynomial are 7.4335 and 1.013 and one root is still
close to the unit circle.
Let us now consider the mixed causal-noncausal processes, which allow for more
complex dynamics including the spikes and bubbles with possibly asymmetric pat-
terns of growth and burst. We start with a noncausal MAR(1,1) process that com-
bines the causal and noncausal components.
(1− φL)(1− ψL−1)yt = εt, (4.4.4)
It is estimated with an objective function value of 706.773270:
Parameters Estimates st error* t-ratio*
ψ 0.9843 0.0703 2.1383
φ 0.1504 0.0120 81.4352
γ 2.5944 0.2297 11.2947
The roots of the MAR(1,1) lie outside the unit circle. The root of the non-causal
polynomial is 1.02. The MAR(2,2) model below
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(1− φ1L− φ2L2)(1− ψ1L−1 − ψ2L−2)yt = εt,
is estimated with an objective function value of 696.384026:
Parameters Estimates st error* t-ratio*
ψ1 0.6492 0.0939 6.9114
ψ2 0.3092 0.0950 3.2540
φ1 0.5530 0.0977 5.6583
φ2 -0.0580 0.0785 -0.7397
γ 2.6438 0.2192 12.0579
The roots of both polynomials are 5.4035 and 4.1309 and -1.631393 and 3.73171 for
both polynomials, respectively. They are outside the unit circle.
The MAR(2,1) model:
(1− ψ1L−1 − ψ2L−2)(1− φL)yt = εt,
is estimated with an objective function value of 696.634560:
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Parameters Estimates st error* t-ratio*
ψ1 0.6816 0.0782 8.7109
ψ2 0.2708 0.0738 3.6666
φ 0.4945 0.0614 8.0435
γ 2.6283 0.2252 11.6676
The roots of the autoregressive polynomials are 4.1199 and -1.59770 and are outside
the unit circle.
We conclude that the stationary mixed causal-noncausal processes can accommodate
the dynamics of the WTI crude oil prices. The best fit is provided by the MAR(1,1)
process which has the highest value of the log-likelihood function at the maximum
and the roots of autoregressive polynomials outside the unit circle.
The forecasts from the MAR(1,1) process can be computed from a closed-form
formula of the predictive density as shown in Section .
4.4.2 Convolution Model
4.2.1 The Model
An alternative approach that accommodates the mixture representation is based
on the assumption that process Yt is a convolution of a Gaussian causal AR(1) and
a Cauchy noncausal MAR(0,1):
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Yt = Xt + Zt,
where
Xt = ρXt−1 + σεt, |ρ| < 1
is a stationary Gaussian AR(1) with εt ∼ IIN(0, 1). The marginal distribution of
Xt is Xt ∼ N(0, σ
2
1−ρ2 ).
The stationary noncausal component is:
Zt = rZt+1 + γεt, |r| < 1
where εt is i.i.d. Cauchy C(0, 1). The marginal distribution of Zt is such that Zt(1−
|r|)/γ ∼ C(0, 1).
The noise processes εt and εt are independent. Therefore, the distribution of (Yt)
is the convoluate of the distributions of (Xt) and (Zt). The joint distribution of
(YtYt−1) can be examined from its joint characteristic function.
Let ϕ(u, v) denote the characteristic function of Yt, Yt−1:
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ϕ(u, v) = E[exp i(uYt + vYt−1)]
= E{exp[i(uXt + vXt−1)] exp[i(uZt + vZt−1)]}
= E{exp i(uXt + vXt−1)} E{exp i(uZt + vZt−1)}
We have uXt + vXt−1 = (uρ+ v)Xt−1 +uσεt. Thus the first expectation on the right
hand side can be written as:
E{exp i(uXt + vXt−1)} = E{exp i(uρ+ v)Xt−1}E{exp(iσuεt)}







Similarly, we have uZt+vZt−1 = (u+rv)Zt+vγεt−1 and E[exp(ivγεt−1)] = exp[−γ|v|].
Also Zt = γεt + γrεt+1 + γr
2εt+2 + · · · .
Moreover,






Therefore, the second expectation can be written as:
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We can estimate the parameter vector θ = [ρ, r, σ2, γ]′ from observations y1, ..., yT
by finding
θ̂ = argmin ||ϕ̃T (u, v)− ϕ(u, v)||2,
where ||.||2 denotes a norm on the space of functions u, v and






given the symmetry of the Normal and Cauchy distributions [see, Gourieroux and
Zakoian (2017)].
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For estimation, we consider an Euclidean norm constructed from a grid of values
(uj, vj), j = 1, ..., J . The grid covers the interval (-0.5,1.5) with increments of 0.001.
We estimate the process and obtain 12 :
Parameters ρ σ r γ
estimates 0.506 2.880 0.910 1.995
st. error 0.027 0.600 0.083 0.191
In order to verify if the deconvolution model can replicate the bimodal sample density
of the data, we simulate a sample of mixture process with the values of coefficients
equal to the estimates and the error from Cauchy and Normal distributions with
variances set equal to the estimates given above. Next, we compute its histogram
and kernel-smoothed density, which is displayed in Figure 4.11 below.
[Insert Figure 4.11: Histogram, simulated y]
The simulated model can replicate the bimodality revealed in the sample distri-
bution of oil prices.
4.5 Nonlinear Forecast
The MAR(1,1) specification can provide the forecasts of WTI series.
It follows from Lanne and Saikkonen (2011), and Lanne, Luoto, and Saikkonen
(2012), that process (yt) has the following unobserved components ut, vt defined by:
12See Gourieroux and Zakoian (2018) for the asymptotic validity of the standard errors
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ut ≡ (1− φL)yt ↔ (1− ψL−1)ut = εt, (4.5.5)
and
vt ≡ (1− ψL−1)yt ↔ (1− φL)vt = εt, (4.5.6)
which can be interpreted as the “causal” and “noncausal” components of process
(yt). Precisely, (ut) is a pure noncausal and (vt) is a pure causal autoregressive
process of order 1. Moreover, i) ut is ε-noncausal and y-causal and ii) vt is ε-causal
and y-noncausal. However, these processes are based on the same noise εt and are
not independent. They can be combined to construct the series yt.
The above unobserved component representation of process yt can be used for
filtering and forecasting.
4.5.1 Filtering and Simulation
The filtering procedure allows us to compute the unobserved components given the
observations on process (yt), over a period of length T . Let (y1, . . . , yT ) denote the
observed sequence.
The values of unobserved components u and v and errors ε can be computed from
a set of observations (y1, . . . , yT ) as follows:
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(i) From equation 4.4.4 for t = 2, . . . , T − 1, we obtain the values ε2, . . . , εT−1 as
functions of (y1, . . . , yT ).
(ii) From equation 4.5.5 : ut = (1− φL)yt, t = 2, . . . , T , we obtain u2, . . . , uT .
(iii) From equation 4.5.6 : vt = (1−ψL−1)yt, t = 1, . . . , T −1, we obtain v1, . . . , vT−1.
When an additional observation yT+1 becomes available, the set of unobserved com-
ponents can be updated by computing εT , uT+1 and vT .
The above formulas can be used to simulate the trajectories of process (yt) as
follows:
step 1: Simulate a path of i.i.d. errors εst , t = 1, ..., T .











t−1, t = −T, ..., T,
starting from a far terminal condition (resp. far initial condition) us2T = u0, say
(resp. vs−T = v0).
108
step 3: The simulated trajectory (yst ) is obtained from either one of the two partial











t+1), t = 1, ..., T. (4.5.7)
4.5.2 Forecasting from the MAR(1,1) Model
The information set (y1, . . . , yT ) is equivalent to the information set (v1, . . . , v2, ε2, . . . , εT−1,
uT , . . . , uT ), as shown in Gourieroux and Jasiak (2016). Therefore, the information
contained in (y1, . . . , yT+H) is equivalent to the information in (v1, ε2, . . . , εT+H−1, uT+1, . . . , uT+H),
and it is also equivalent to that in (v1, ε2, ..., εT−1, uT , ..., uT+H), because (1−ψ(L−1))ut =
εt, t = T, . . . , T +H − s by formula 4.5.5.
Thus, instead of predicting the future value of y, at horizonH, we can equivalently
predict the future value of the ε-noncausal component u, by finding the predictive
density Π̂ at horizon H for a noncausal process of order 1:
For a given error density g and for known values of coefficients φ, ψ we get :
Π̂(uT+1, . . . , uT+H |ûT )
=
g(ûT − ψuT+1)g(uT+1 − ψuT+2)g(uT+H−1 − ψuT+H)
∑T
t=1 g(uT+H − ψût)∑T




where ût, t = 1 + 1, ..., T are the filtered values of the ε-noncausal component, that
are functions of y1, ...., yT and of coefficients φ, ψ.
The predictive density given above has a closed-form representation when the
error density g is known. In particular, when ε follows a Cauchy distribution, the





1 + (uT − ψuT+1)2
1 + (1− ψ)2u2T
1 + (1− ψ)2u2T+1
, (4.5.9)
and the predictive joint distribution of two future values is:




1 + (uT − ψuT+1)2
1
1 + (uT+1 − ψuT+2)2
×
1 + (1− ψ)2u2T
1 + (1− ψ)2u2T+2
. (4.5.10)
The above forecasting method developed by Gourieroux and Jasiak (2016) relies on
a closed-form formula of the estimated predictive density Π̂ given above.
An alternative forecasting method proposed by Lanne, Luoto, and Saikkonen
(2012) relies on the simulations of long paths of future εT+1, ..., εT+M , from which
the future vectors uT+1, ...., uT+H are recovered. That method approximates nu-
merically the predictive density from a large number of simulations and is more
computationally demanding. The approximation to the predictive density is based
on a truncation uT ≈
∑M
j=1 βjεT+j, which entails a truncation bias. That bias can
be arbitrarily reduced by sufficiently increasing the truncation parameter M .
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4.5.3 MAR Forecasts of WTI Crude Oil Prices
Let us now examine the forecasting performance of the MAR(1,1) model in applica-
tion to the WTI crude oil price data over the last 8 months of the sampling period,
i.e. for T = 221 to 228.
The one step ahead out-of-sample forecasts of WTI crude oil prices are computed
from the MAR(1,1) model, by applying the ”GJ” method of Gourieroux and Jasiak
(2016), and the ”LLS” method of Lanne, Luoto, and Saikkonen (2012). Next, the
forecasts are compared to the true values of median adjusted oil prices and the
”no-change” forecast, denoted by ”NC” and equal to the last observed value of the
process.
The GJ forecasts of the last 8 values of the process are given in Table 4.14 below
in column 3. The true values of the process are given in column 1, Column 2 reports
the filtered values of the noncausal component u. Column 4 contains the prediction
error of that forecast. Columns 5 and 6 present the lower and upper prediction
interval at 50% obtained from the lower and upper quartile of the predictive density.
The level of 50% is chosen to eliminate the effect of long tails. Column 7 shows
the forecast from the MAR(1,1) process based on the LLS method with a t-student
approximation of the error distribution. Column 8 provides the prediction error of
that forecast. Column 9 provides the ”no-change” forecast NC. Column 10 reports
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the forecast error of the NC forecast.
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Table 4.14: One Step Ahead Out-Of-Sample Forecasts of Demeaned WTI Crude Oil
true yT+1 uT+1 ŷT+1 er.(ŷT+1) PI(ŷT+1) L PI(ŷT+1) U ỹT+1 er.(ỹT+1) NC er(NC)
y(221) = 10.805 9.743 7.463 3.341 -13.136 16.863 6.919 3.885 7.075 3.73
y(222) = 8.695 7.0742 11.235 -2.540 -9.464 20.535 11.308 -2.613 10.805 -2.11
y(223) = 11.805 10.500 8.358 3.446 -11.541 18.458 8.654 3.150 8.695 3.11
y(224) = 8.885 7.114 12.119 -3.234 -8.480 21.519 12.044 -3.159 11.805 -2.92
y(225) = 11.055 9.722 8.946 2.109 -11.354 18.645 9.171 1.883 8.885 2.17
y(226) = 11.575 9.916 11.281 0.293 -9.218 20.781 10.944 0.630 11.055 0.52
y(227) = -2.215 -3.951 11.493 -13.708 -8.706 21.293 11.077 -13.292 -1 11.575 -13.79
y(228) = -9.655 -9.332 -3.180 6.474 -22.280 7.719 -3.304 6.350 -2.215 -7.44
The forecasts from the MAR(1,1) based on both methods provide very close results
in the application to the WTI crude oil prices. The median forecast error based on
Lanne et al. is 1.2565 as compared to 1.201 for Gourieroux and Jasiak. The median
forecast error of the no-change method is -0.795. The prediction interval, obtained
from the predictive density of Gourieroux and Jasiak method contains the true values
of the process for each yT+1. The method of Lanne et al. available on-line does not
provide a prediction interval.
The GJ method provides forecasts with mean forecast error of -0.477 and mean
squared error (MSE) of 34.287, which are slightly above the mean forecast error
of -0.395 and MSE of 32.845 for the LSS. The ”no-change” method has the worse
performance with mean forecast error of -2.0912 and MSE of 35.882. Hence, the




This chapter introduced a new convolution model for monthly WTI crude oil prices,
which accommodates local trends in its dynamics and a multimodal sample density
evidenced in Section 4.2. The results show that the convolution approach presents
a promising approach for modelling the monthly WTI crude oil prices. We also
estimated the comovements between the Ontario consumer price and energy price
indexes and the WTI crude oil prices. The comovements between these series al-
low for forecasting the Ontario price indexes using either the VEC model, or linear
functions of the forecasts of oil prices provided from the mixed autoregressive causal-
noncausal model.
The forecasts based on the noncausal MAR(1,1) model of the WTI crude oil
prices were computed from two methods of forecasting for autoregressive causal-
noncausal processes. Both the methods using MAR model to forecast the WTI crude
oil price outperformed the ”no change” forecast. The results suggest the proposed
model estimated under both method outperforms existing models and provide close
approximations of out of sample values, as the model can accommodate the various
asymmetric local trends observed in the WTI data distribution.
Under a more turbulent economic environment, for example with the COVID 19
pandemic causing a steep change in oil price, a separate cointegration analysis should
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be performed on the relationship between the WTI and Ontario price indices to verify
any changes and the validity of the VEC models. The convolution model and the
forecasts based on the noncausal MAR(1,1) model should be estimated with updated
data. The forecast under these models should still produce a close approximation,
as the model can accommodate various asymmetric local trends.
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Figure 4.1: Dynamics of OCPI, OEP and WTI Crude oil prices
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Figure 4.2: Dynamics of transformed OCPI, OEP and WTI crude oil price in US$
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Figure 4.3: Departures from long-term relation of OEP and OCPI- Residuals Model
(4.3.1)
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Figure 4.4: Rgression of OEP on oil prices - Residuals
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Figure 4.5: Departures from long-term relation of oil prices and OEP - Residuals
(4.3.2)
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Figure 4.7: WTI Crude Oil Prices: Histogram
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Figure 4.8: Crude Oil - QQ Plot
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Figure 4.9: Crude Oil - QQ Plot
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Given the volatility in commodity prices and the prevalent use of financial deriva-
tive to hedge price volatility, this thesis focuses on two themes: (i) how to align
hedging decision between mangers and shareholder using executive compensation to
maximize firm value, and (ii) how the commodity/index prices can be forecasted.
Chapters Two and Three addresses the agency problem presented in past liter-
ature whereby risk-averse mangers tends to over-hedge (Holmstorm and Ricart i.
Costa, 1986; Smith and Stulz, 1985). I developed a model to mitigate the agency
problem by aligning hedging with the use of executive compensation. My first contri-
bution is determining the factors that affect hedging decision and optimal executive
compensation. Second, using these factors I show how the agency problem can be
mitigated in practice. In the third chapter, I empirically test my model findings, the
additional contribution is using manually collected firm hedging data from the firms’
10K reports to show empirically equity-based executive compensation is negatively
related to hedging which is consistent with prior research Chen, Jin, and Wen (2011),
and Tufano (1996).
Future research will be focused on further examining the relationship between
executive compensation and hedging. For example, developing a model to study the
effects of different types of derivatives while considering the role of the risk-averse
managers, or studying the effects in a multi-period model. Another possible study
128
can examine the not only the hedging of price risk, but also quantity risk.
Chapter Four focuses on how commodity/index prices can be forecasted. Being
able to forecast the commodity prices provides insight into the economic environment,
which can then be used to determine the optimal compensation scheme, as one of the
factors affecting optimal executive compensation is volatility of commodity prices.
The chapter’s first contribution is modelling and forecasting the WTI oil prices by
estimating the long-run relationships between the Ontario price indexes, and the
WTI oil prices. The forecasts of the Ontario price indexes and WTI crude oil prices
are obtained by the cointegration analysis. Alternatively, the forecasts of Ontario
price indexes are provided by the functions of the WTI crude oil price forecasts
combined with the forecast of the stationary series of departures from the long run
equilibrium. Second, this chapter provide a new method to model the oil price process
(i.e. a convolution of stationary causal and noncausal processes). The forecast of
the WTI crude oil prices can be obtained by forecasting the convoluted series or
conversely, from a simple mixed causal -noncausal model of WTI crude oil prices.
The latter approach allows for the comparison of the two methods of forecasting
for noncausal processes developed by Lanne, Luoto and Saikkonen (2012) and by
Gourieroux and Jasiak (2016).
Related future research will be focused on the use of cointegration analysis for
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different commodities and series and the use of the convolution approach. Also, we




Chapter 2 & 3
[1] Berkman, H. and M.E. Bradbury, 1996, ”Empirical Evidence on Corporate Use
of Derivatives.” Financial Management 25, 5–13
[2] Bodnar, Gordon M., Erasmo Giambona, John R. Graham, and Campbell R.
Harvey, 2014, ”A View Inside Corporate Risk Management.” University of Am-
sterdam - Available at SSRN 2438884 (2014).
[3] Brown, Gregory W., and Klaus Bjerre Toft, 2002, ”How firms should hedge.”
Review of Financial Studies 15.4 (2002): 1283-1324.
[4] Chen Chao, Yanbo Jin, and Min-Ming Wen, 2011, ”Executive compensation,
hedging, and firm value. ” California State University Northridge working paper
(2011).
[5] Chang, Chun. ”Does Hedging Aggravate or Alleviate Agency Problems? A
Managerial Theory of Risk Management, 1997, ” A Managerial Theory of Risk
Management (July 1, 1997) (1997).
[6] Cohen, Randolph B., Brian J. Hall, and Luis M. Viceira, 2002, ”Do Executive
Stock Options Encourage Risk-Taking? ” (2000)
[7] Core, John and Wayne Guay, 2002, ”Estimating the value of employee stock
option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility.” Journal of Ac-
counting Research 40, 613-30.
[8] DeMarzo, Peter M., and Darrell Duffie, 1991, ”Corporate financial hedging with
proprietary information.” Journal of Economic Theory 53.2 (1991): 261-286.
[9] Feng, Y., Tian, Y.S., 2009, ”Option expensing and managerial equity incen-
tives.” Financial Markets, Institutions, and Instruments 18, 195-241.
[10] Froot, Kenneth A., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein ,1993, ”Risk
management: Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies.” the
Journal of Finance 48.5 (1993): 1629-1658.
131
[11] Froot, Kenneth A., and Jeremy C. Stein , 1998, ”Risk management, capital
budgeting, and capital structure policy for financial institutions: an integrated
approach.” Journal of Financial Economics 47.1 (1998): 55-82.
[12] Geczy, C., B.A. Minton, and C. Schrand, 1997, ”Why Firms Use Derivatives.”
Journal of Finance 52, 1323–1354.
[13] Gibbons, Robert, 2005, ”Incentives between firms (and within).” Management
Science 51.1 (2005): 2-17.
[14] Graham, John R., and Clifford W. Smith, 1999, ”Tax incentives to hedge.” The
Journal of Finance 54.6 (1999): 2241-2262.
[15] Graham, John R., and Daniel A. Rogers, 2002, ”Do firms hedge in response to
tax incentives?.” The Journal of Finance 57.2 (2002): 815-839.
[16] Holmstrom, B. and J. Ricart i Costa, 1986, ”Managerial Incentives and Capital
Management.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 835–860.
[17] Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling ,1979, ”Theory of the firm: Man-
agerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure” Springer Netherlands,
1979.
[18] Jin, Yanbo, and Philippe Jorion, 2006 ”Firm value and hedging: Evidence from
US oil and gas producers.” The Journal of Finance 61.2 (2006): 893-919.
[19] Kuwornu, John KM, et al, 2005, ”Time-varying Hedge Ratios: A Principal-agent
Approach.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 56.3 (2005): 417-432.
[20] Leland, Hayne E, 1998, ”Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure.”
The Journal of Finance 53.4 (1998): 1213-1243.
[21] Murphy, Kevin J., 2013, ”Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How
We Got There,” Handbook of the Economics of Finance
[22] Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller, 1958, ”The cost of capital, corpo-
ration finance and the theory of investment.” The American economic review
(1958): 261-297.
[23] Nance, Deana R., Clifford W. Smith, and Charles W. Smithson, 1993, ”On
the determinants of corporate hedging.” The Journal of Finance 48.1 (1993):
267-284.
132
[24] Prendergast, Canice, 2002, ”The Tenuous Trade-Off between Risk and Incen-
tives. Journal of Political Economy’, Vol. 110, October 2002.
[25] Rajgopal, Shivaram, and Terry Shevlin, 2002, ”Empirical evidence on the rela-
tion between stock option compensation and risk taking.” Journal of Accounting
and Economics 33.2 (2002): 145-171.
[26] Rogers, Daniel, 2002, ”Does executive portfolio structure affect risk manage-
ment? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage.” Journal of
Banking and Finance 80, 271-295.
[27] Ross, Stephen A, 1973, ”The economic theory of agency: The principal’s prob-
lem. ”The American Economic Review (1973): 134-139.
[28] Smith, Clifford W., and Rene M. Stulz, 1985, ”The determinants of firms’ hedg-
ing policies.” Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 20.04 (1985): 391-
405.
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Additional Figures
Figure 4.12: CAD/USD Exchange Rates
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Figure 4.13: OCPI in US$ - QQ Plot
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Figure 4.14: OCPI in US$ - QQ Plot
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Figure 4.15: Residual Model (4.3.1) - Density
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Figure 4.16: Residual Model (4.3.1) - QQ Plot
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Figure 4.17: Residual Model (4.3.2) - Density
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Figure 4.18: Residual Model (4.3.2) - QQ Plot
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Appendix 3: Chapter 4 - Additional Tables
Table 4.15: VEC Model Parameter Estimates
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Table 4.16: VEC Model Parameter Estimates
The sample standard deviations of the OEP and OCPI residuals are 4.659 and
2.600, respectively. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null
hypothesis of normality of these residuals at 5% with the p-values of 0.083 and
0.086, respectively.
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ARMA models of departures from long-run equilibrium
Table 4.17: departures from long-run equilibrium (Model 4.3.1)
AR1 AR2 MA1 MA2 ARMA1,1 ARMA 1,2 ARMA 2,1
Dtregress
Constant -0.575 -1.007 -0.0467 -0.0580 -1.068 -0.899 -0.885
(2.595) (3.331) (0.885) (1.048) (3.499) (3.231) (3.160)
ARMA
Lag 1 0.857∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 0.397
(0.0405) (0.0774) (0.0329) (0.0381) (0.264)
Lag 2 0.259∗∗∗ 0.462∗
(0.0770) (0.224)
e1 0.601∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗ -0.256∗∗ 0.258




Constant 4.600∗∗∗ 4.441∗∗∗ 6.632∗∗∗ 5.367∗∗∗ 4.465∗∗∗ 4.444∗∗∗ 4.432∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.251) (0.423) (0.333) (0.250) (0.253) (0.251)
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
AIC 926.1 917.3 1039.4 976.2 919.0 919.5 918.7
BIC 935.3 929.5 1048.6 988.4 931.2 934.8 934.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results show that the AR2 model has the best fit.
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Table 4.18: OEP regress on WTI - (Model 4.3.2)
AR1 AR2 MA1 MA2 ARMA1,1 ARMA 1,2 ARMA 2,1
Dtregress
Constant -0.143 -0.0574 -0.000797 0.00523 -0.0684 -0.0466 -0.0565
(2.251) (1.771) (0.666) (0.831) (1.920) (1.757) (1.748)
ARMA
Lag 1 0.878∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0746) (0.0466) (0.0648) (0.332)
Lag 2 -0.239∗∗∗ -0.284
(0.0673) (0.293)
e1 0.758∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ -0.0548




Constant 3.434∗∗∗ 3.336∗∗∗ 4.661∗∗∗ 3.832∗∗∗ 3.346∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗∗ 3.335∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.164) (0.224) (0.180) (0.165) (0.166) (0.165)
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
AIC 835.2 828.2 929.8 871.5 829.1 829.8 830.2
BIC 844.3 840.4 938.9 883.7 841.3 845.1 845.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results shows that the AR2 and ARMA(1,1) models provide the best fit.
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